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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effects of the Political-Legal Environment and Corporate Characteristics on 
Mergers and Acquisitions in India, 1991-2005. (May 2012) 
Shilpa Ranganathan, B.A., Stella Maris College; M.A., Jawaharlal Nehru University; 
M.Phil., Jawaharlal Nehru University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Harland Prechel 
 
Emerging markets such as India have witnessed waves of domestic and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.  This historical analysis, which consists of two parts, 
tests central tenets of resource dependence theory.  The first part entails an analysis of 
the transition in public policy governing corporations between 1991 and 2005.  The 
second part tests hypotheses derived from resource dependence theory relating to a 
firm’s decision to acquire.  The analysis explores the factors that explain why firms 
engage in mergers and acquisitions by examining three specific policy periods (i.e., 
1991-1996, 1997-2001 and 2002-2005).  The findings from the historical analysis 
suggest that firms did not merely react to the conditions (i.e., constraints on capital) in 
their environment by undertaking merger and acquisition activity, but attempted to alter 
them as resource dependence theory suggests.  Findings from the event history logit 
model also support resource dependence theory.  Overall, the study shows that merger 
and acquisition activity increased during a period of intense deregulation (i.e., 1991-
2005) brought about by the adoption of neo-liberal reforms, change to the multilayer 
  
iv 
subsidiary form, deregulation of the banking and financial sectors’ and reforms in 
foreign direct investment and equity markets.  During this period of uncertainty, firms 
controlling more resources in terms of earnings, efficiency and number of subsidiaries 
were more likely to undertake acquisition activity as they have leverage in organization-
environment relationships.  The effect of number of subsidiaries on acquisition activity 
was the most consistent across policy periods’.   
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  CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions have important economic and political 
consequences, and thus, have been the subject of interest in sociological research and 
discussion (Pfeffer 1972; Stearns 1986; Fligstein 1990; Davis and Stout 1992; 
Haunschild 1993; Palmer, Barber, Zhou and Soysal 1995; Stearns and Allan 1996; 
Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Morris 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007; Palmer and Barber 2001).  
From an economic perspective, mergers and acquisitions enable firms to achieve 
efficiency by economizing on scale i.e. firms attempt to increase the volume of their 
production by decreasing the average cost of production.  Although mergers and 
acquisitions may result in the efficient use of capital to maximize profit, there are some 
negative consequences which affect the lives of people, especially employees (Tynes 
1997).  The acquiring firm replaces the employees or management of the target firm with 
its own or relocates them in firms situated in other cities or states within a country or the 
world.  The transfer of control from one firm to another usually involves the 
redistribution of economic resources among the business elite in society (Palmer et al.  
1995). Thus, the control of economic resources enables the business elite to influence 
policies in their favor, at the expense of neglect of other classes (Prechel 1990).   
___________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Sociological Review. 
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During the period 1991 to 2005, mergers and acquisitions among firms in India 
increased, both, in terms of level of activity as well as valuation of that activity.  The 
total deal value increased from $35 million1 in 1992 to a peak of $1.52 billion in 1997 
and remained above the $1 billion mark through the year 2001 (see Figure 1.1).  In 
subsequent years, merger and acquisition activity continued to increase rapidly.  
According to India Advisory Partners, a consulting firm tracking mergers, the value of 
transactions in 2002 jumped to $7.41 billion (“Indian mergers double” 2002).  While 
there was a slight decline in 2003 with deals worth $5.11 billion, the average deal value 
increased by 64 percent in 2004 (Winterbotham and Taraporevala 2004).  Merger and 
acquisition activity continued to increase between 2004 and 2005 and reached an all-
time record of 100 percent growth with deals worth $12.3 billion. In 2005 alone, there 
was a 52 percent rise in the number of merger and acquisition deals (“India witness” 
2005).  By number of deals, Indian firms were ranked fifth in terms of being frequent 
targets of merger and acquisition transactions and seventh in terms of being the most 
active acquirers in Asia in 2005 (“$20 billion M&A” 2005). 
The upward trend in mergers and acquisitions among Indian firms (see Figure 
1.1) following the liberalization of the economy in 1991 poses some important questions 
regarding, the reasons behind the sudden flourish in mergers and acquisitions, the types’ 
and characteristics’ of firms that participated in these transactions and changes in the 
political, economic and global realm that promoted this corporate strategy.  It is worth 
noting that firms undertook mergers and acquisitions prior to the liberalization of the 
                                               
1
 Unless otherwise specified, all values are in United States dollars.  
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economy (i.e., 1991) but they were excessively regulated and was mostly confined to 
state-owned enterprises and family-owned businesses. In this context, it is interesting to 
understand what motivated firms to increasingly resort to a specific corporate strategy 
(i.e., mergers and acquisitions) to concentrate their assets in the new economic 
environment.  Thus, my research question is: What organizational characteristics and 
political-legal changes help explain mergers and acquisitions between 1991 and 2005? 
 
Merger and Acquisition Waves in India 
 Mergers and acquisitions as a strategy for corporate growth evolved gradually as 
the corporate sector in India transitioned from being dominated by family-owned 
businesses and state-owned enterprises (i.e., public sector)2 to one that was privatized, 
liberalized and deregulated.   
The first merger wave occurred during the 1980s and was prior to the 
deregulation of the economy (i.e., 1991).  With a few family-owned business groups and 
the public sector dominating the corporate sector, it was a highly non-competitive 
environment.  A family-owned business group will usually consist of one or more 
independent parent companies that are owned and controlled by family members.  Each 
parent company may own and control several subsidiary corporations.   
 
                                               
2
 Businesses that are owned, managed and controlled by the central, state or local governments are known 
as state-owned enterprises or public sector undertakings or public enterprises.  A public sector enterprise is 
defined as any commercial or industrial business that is owned and managed by the government with a 
view to maximize social welfare and protect the interests of the public.   
  
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Number of Mergers and Acquisitions in India, 1973-2003  
Source: Research & Statistics Division, Department of Company Affairs, Agarwal  
              (2002).
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The private sector that was comprised mostly of family-owned businesses was 
excessively regulated by the licensing system with a view to expand the role of the state 
in industrial development (Tripathi 2004).   
The licensing system was established to control the pace and pattern of industrial 
development in India after the country gained Independence from the British in 1947. It 
was a part of a broader regulatory structure known as the Industries (Development and 
Regulation) Act of 1951.  The Act of 1951 listed industries such as arms and 
ammunition, atomic energy, coal, iron and steel, air and railway transport as being 
exclusively reserved for the public sector.  In addition, in industries such as machine 
tools, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, road and transportation that were already owned by 
the State, private sector businesses, in particular, had to obtain a license from a 
government oversight agency to participate in economic activity (e.g., exports, imports, 
investments).  Thus, the licensing system was set up to secure the dominance of the 
public sector, regulate and restrict the entry and growth of new firms, control the 
expansion of existing firms and monitor the flow of foreign capital and technology into 
the country.  An important consequence of the licensing system was an increase in the 
power of the State to implement industrial policy (Chibber 2003, p.127). 
The licensing system had two consequences with regard to Indian firms pursuing 
mergers and acquisitions.  First, the only way for a firm to grow was to buy another 
company since any form of expansion in production capacity or otherwise in the existing 
company would be subject to licensing regulations. Businesses owned by families like 
those of R.P. Goenka, Vijay Mallya and Manu Chabria used the merger and acquisition 
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strategy to grow aggressively during this phase (Ramakrishnan 2007:16). Second, 
family-owned businesses were forced to move into areas where capabilities were 
difficult to develop in the short run.  As a result, there were some unrelated 
diversifications (i.e., mergers and acquisitions between firms producing unrelated 
products) during this period.  This resulted in the formation of huge conglomerate3 firms.  
The family-owned businesses, Tatas, Birlas and Reliance are the largest conglomerates 
in India and invested in a wide range of industries, including textiles, cement, tea, soap, 
detergent, hotels, sponge iron and aluminum, steel, and telecommunication. 
The second wave of mergers and acquisitions accompanied the introduction of 
economic reforms in the 1990s.  Deregulation, privatization and globalization of 
corporate property rights were the central components of the new structural reforms.4  In 
the newly liberalized economy, two trends were witnessed with regard to mergers and 
acquisitions.  First, some of the family-owned business groups that had diversified into 
multiple product lines in the first wave had to sell their unproductive units or non-core 
businesses due to competitive pressures.  For example, the family-owned business, Tata, 
sold TOMCO (Tata Oil Mill Corporation) to Hindustan Lever, an Indian subsidiary of 
the European multinational firm, Unilever.  Tatas wanted to focus on their primary 
industry (i.e., steel and cement) and decided to sell TOMCO which is in the fast moving 
consumer goods sector5.  Second, multinational corporations acquired Indian firms or 
                                               
3
 A conglomerate is a combination of two or more firms belonging to completely different industries’.  
 
4
 According to Olivia and Suarez (2007), structural reforms can change the fundamental structure of the 
economy.  They include changes in regulations, tariffs, tax rates and control of capital transactions.   
 
5
 Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) goods are popularly named as consumer packaged goods. Items 
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entered into joint ventures with some of them.  From 1993 to 2000, there were 239 
acquisitions of Indian firms by multinational corporations.  Some of the most prominent 
takeovers and joint ventures have been in the automobile, fast moving consumer goods, 
pharmaceuticals, food and beverages and services sectors’ (Kumar 2000).  For example, 
Puegeot of France entered into a joint venture with Premier in 1993-94 and Toyota 
Motor Corporation of Japan entered into a joint venture with Kirloskar Group of India in 
1997 to produce inexpensive cars for Indian consumers.  Parle, one of the biggest firms 
in the food and beverages’ market in India was acquired by Coca-Cola in 1993.   
Due to competitive pressures in the new economy, some of the family-owned 
business groups restructured their organizations as well.  For example, family-owned 
business groups, Goenka and Godrej, transformed their product divisions into “strategic 
business units” and provided these units with freedom to make financial and investment 
decisions and also enter into alliances (see Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation about the 
relationship between change in corporate form and mergers and acquisitions).  Some 
new venture firms like Tata Consultancy Services and Wipro Infotech resorted to the 
matrix organizational structure in which divisions were grouped both by core 
competence, principal markets and industries served (Mukerjea and George 1995; 
Khandwalla 2002:429). 
 During the years 2000-2005, which can be considered as the third wave in 
mergers and acquisitions, four trends were witnessed. First, there was consolidation in 
                                                                                                                                          
in this category include all consumables (other than groceries/pulses) that people buy at regular intervals. 
The most common in the list are soaps, detergents, shampoos, toothpaste, shaving products, shoe polish, 
packaged foodstuff, and household accessories and extends to certain electronic goods. 
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certain sectors, especially in cement and telecommunication.  Second, the number of out-
bound (international) deals exceeded the number of in-bound (domestic) deals in 2005.  
Between January 2000 and March 2006, Indian firms acquired 244 foreign firms (Sinha 
2010:46).  Third, a large number of horizontal merger and acquisition transactions (i.e., 
between firms in the same industry) took place during this phase.  Fourth, there was an 
increase in the number of multinational corporations and their subsidiaries establishing 
their base in India through the merger and acquisition route, as compared to the previous 
two waves. For example, Swiss Cement Company, Holcim acquired ACC Cements for 
$810 million in 2005 and U.S. based Software Company, Oracle purchased a 41 percent 
stake in I-flex Solutions for $593 million (Sharma n.d.).  
A few examples of outbound and horizontal merger and acquisition deals during 
this phase are as follows: Tata Tea Group acquired Tetley Tea of United Kingdom in 
2000 for $428 million.  A significant point about this deal was that a major part of the 
cost of the acquisition was raised from foreign investors and banks. In 2003, FLAG 
Telecom, a global undersea telecommunication company was acquired by Reliance 
Indocom, one of the biggest firms in the telecom sector in India, for $207 million.  In the 
same year, Tata Motors acquired the truck assets of Korea’s Daewoo Motors Company 
for $118 million and in terms of deal-value was considered to be the sixth largest 
outbound deal for that year. In the software sector, the Indian-based company BFL 
Software acquired U.S. based Mphasis Corp (software business) in an all-stock deal for 
$200.8 million (Pradhan and Abraham 2005).   
The fourth wave that is currently in progress is a witness to merger and 
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acquisition transactions with enormous deal values (i.e., mega-mergers) and the 
increasing globalization of deals.  There are two trends in the current wave:  First, there 
has been a dramatic increase in the number of Indian companies acquiring companies 
overseas (see Figure 1.2).  Indian outbound deals, which were valued at $0.7 billion in 
2000-01, increased to $4.3 billion in 2005, and crossed the $15 billion-mark in 2006 
(Prabhudesai n.d.).  Second, the deal values of the acquisitions are record high compared 
to the previous merger waves. 
In the first nine months of 2006, for example, Indian companies announced 115 
foreign acquisitions with a deal value totaling $7.4 billion (i.e., approximately a seven-
fold increase from 2000) and reaching a little over $15 billion by the end of the year.  
During January to May of 2007, the total value of merger and acquisition deals was 
estimated to be $47.37 billion, out of which the cross-border deals were valued at 28.19 
billion (Majumdar 2007).  A report by Grant Thornton India shows that the largest 
proportion of outbound deals occurred in Europe (42 percent of the deal value) and 
North America (24 percent of the deal value).  Industry-wise, the largest number of deals 
was in the information technology, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare and biotech sectors.  
In terms of deal value, telecommunications ranked highest with 33.6% share of deal 
value, followed by energy at 14%, information technology at 8% and steel at 6.5%.  
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   Figure 1.2 Number of Outbound deals by Indian Firms 
   Source: Prabhudesai, Arun. N.d. Indian Mergers and Acquisitions: The Changing  
                 Face of Indian Business.  
     
     
A few examples of merger and acquisition deals during this phase are as follows: 
In 2006, one of the biggest deals in the pharmaceutical sector was the acquisition of 
Betapherm (a pharmaceutical company in Germany) by Dr. Reddy Laboratories (Tucker 
and Leahy 2006).  The deal value of the acquisition was $560 million.  In 2007, two 
large acquisitions took place in the telecom and steel sectors, respectively. Vodafone 
Telecom Company of United Kingdom acquired the assets of Hutchinson Essar (one of 
the biggest telecommunication companies of India) and is considered to be the biggest 
transaction in India’s telecom sector.  Tata Steel of India acquired the Anglo-Dutch Steel 
Company Corus in 2007 for $7.6 billion and is considered to the largest takeover of a 
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foreign company by an Indian firm.   
This short history about merger and acquisition waves highlights some important 
themes:  First the unprecedented rates in merger and acquisition activity after 1991 
followed changes in corporations’ institutional arrangements.  Second, like many 
developing countries, the federal government accepted the prevailing neo-liberal 
ideology and reduced its involvement in economic activities in two ways: (a) as a direct 
participant in the production process, and (b) indirect participation in the process of 
production through resource allocation in the economy.  Third, the government redefined 
the political-legal environment within which Indian firms operated.  Fourth, a large 
portion of the Indian economy was incorporated into the global economy.   
The political-legal changes in the environment of corporations involved 
dismantling of the industrial licensing system, dilution of anti-monopoly laws, 
withdrawal of directed credit programs for domestic firms, deregulation of certain 
industrial sectors and opening up of several economic activities to private sector 
participation (Kakani, Saha and Reddy 2006:1-2).  Reforms were implemented in several 
sectors of the economy which facilitated the flow of capital to the industrial sector.  
Changes in the financial sector were manifested in the form of deregulation of interest 
rates and growth of markets for both equity and debt instruments (Kakani, et al. 2006:2).  
The foreign investment sector witnessed the amendment of the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act (FERA), opening up of certain sectors to foreign direct investment, 
raising the limit on foreign direct investment and increase in foreign institutional 
investor participation in the governance of Indian firms (see Chapter 2 for a detailed 
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explanation of the relationship between changes in corporation’s political legal 
arrangements and merger and acquisition activity).  
 Firms that were embedded in these changing institutional arrangements (e.g., 
economic and political changes) attempted, both, to change these institutional 
arrangements by pressurizing state managers to implement policy that was favorable to 
merge and acquire as well as adopt different strategies and forms in order to survive.  
Mergers and acquisitions represent one of the strategies that Indian firms adopted during 
the post 1991 liberalization era (see Figure 1.1) and thus, the focus of this dissertation.  
 
The Dissertation Plan 
There are two parts to this dissertation:  First, I will analyze how historical 
changes in a corporation’s political-legal environment affected merger and acquisition 
activity.  Second, I will examine the factors that cause one firm to acquire another firm 
in three policy periods (i.e., 1991 to 1996, 1997 to 2001 and 2002 to 2005) using 
characteristics of the corporation as variables.  I will evaluate the capacity of resource 
dependency theory to explain mergers and acquisitions.  By focusing on these two 
dimensions of change (e.g., environmental and organizational), I hope to bring a new 
insight in the study of mergers and acquisitions in India.   
This dissertation will be organized into six chapters.  Following the introductory 
chapter, Chapter II is a historical examination of the three policy periods between 1991 
and 2005.  I will include an analysis of the effect of the political-legal environment of 
corporations on mergers and acquisitions.  In Chapter III, I will review the propositions 
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of resource dependence theory that explain organizational change and present research 
hypotheses related to mergers and acquisitions. In Chapter IV, the data, measurement 
and methodology employed in the quantitative analysis will be described.  Chapter V 
presents the findings from the quantitative analysis and discusses the results.  In the 
concluding chapter (Chapter VI), I will present the theoretical findings and discuss the 
limitations and scope of the study.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL-LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
ON MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY* 
 
This chapter on policy environments will provide a context for the quantitative 
analysis by undertaking a historical qualitative analysis of changes in the political-legal 
environment of firms in India.  I will focus on how changes in corporations’ political-
legal environment changed public policy in ways that affected merger and acquisition 
activity.  Particular attention is given to the period following the economic crisis in the 
early 1990s, when public policies and state structures were redefined in ways that 
transformed corporate property rights of Indian firms and permitted increased ownership 
of business enterprises by transnational corporations.  
The theoretical logic guiding my analysis is that organizational change is 
historically contingent.  Historical contingency theory draws from capital dependency 
theory and suggests that periodic constraints to capital accumulation compel action 
(Prechel 1990:665). That is, significant changes in the capital accumulation process 
necessitate a response.  The character of the specific action taken is shaped by the 
political and economic context.  I argue that the political-legal environment of 
corporations’ facilitated or hindered the accumulation of capital and this structured the 
motives and actions of Indian businesses as well as their interests and opportunities for  
___________________ 
*Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from “Political Capitalism, Neoliberalism, and Globalization in 
India: Redefining Foreign Property Rights and Facilitating Corporate Ownership, 1991-2005” by Shilpa Ranganathan 
and Harland Prechel, 2007. Research in Political Sociology, 16, 201-243, Copyright (2007) by Elsevier Ltd. 
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realizing them.  Prechel (1990, 2000), Akard (1992) and Morris (2000, 2004, 2005) have 
shown the strength of the historical contingent framework in analyzing issues in 
organizational and political sociology. 
 
Historical Contingencies 
The examination of social change is a central theoretical concern of historical 
sociology: the conditions under which groups that share an interest act or fail to act on 
that interest (Tilly 1981).  There are two important questions that are related to this 
theoretical problem. First what are the bases of social action? Second, to what extent do 
historical conditions and social structures affect political mobilization and the capacity 
of social actors to exercise power? 
The primary concern is with the disruption in the historical trajectory and the 
historical transitions that result in political mobilization to enact social change.  Whereas 
historical trajectories are interlocked and interdependent sequences of events that 
represent stability, historical transitions are stages along historical trajectories that entail 
radical shifts (Abbott 1997).  The concern here is with the departure from the previous 
historical trajectory and with the sequence of events that produce that shift 
(Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997).  Identifying trajectories and transitions are essential 
to understand historical sequences that produce social change.    
Social structure of accumulation theory suggests that historical transitions are the 
outcome of economic crisis, which emerge when the institutional arrangements (i.e., 
ideological, political, economic) are unable to ensure conditions favorable to capital 
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accumulation (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Kotz, McDonough and Reich 1994).  
However, a breakdown in one part of these institutional arrangements undermines 
capital accumulation (i.e., decay stage)1.  Research examining these historical transitions 
shows that in response to extended periods of capital dependence and economic crisis, 
the capitalist class unifies and mobilizes politically to redefine the political-legal 
arrangements in which corporations are embedded (i.e., exploration stage) (Prechel 
2000)2.  Public policies and state structures are enacted to institutionalize market 
stability in ways that ensure an acceptable rate of capital accumulation for the dominant 
power bloc.  Decay-exploration transitions in the social structure of accumulation entail 
a shift in the dominant economic sector and the internal composition of the dominant 
power bloc (see Table 2.1).   
Although historical transitions are the outcome of class-based political behavior 
that occurs in response to economic crisis, the dominant power bloc does not always 
have the economic and political power to overcome the economic crisis.  Power blocs 
that emerge in the political realm consist of a coalition of classes and class fractions 
whose composition varies historically.  The outcome of power struggles’ to establish a 
new power bloc are enacted as policies and manifested as state structures, which 
redefine the political-legal arrangements within which capital accumulation occurs.   
The central concern here is with the historical transition in India’s political-legal 
                                                        
1
 According to social structure of accumulation theorists, the decay stage represents periods when 
institutional arrangements are not capable of ensuring a constant rate of capital accumulation (Prechel 
2000: 14).  
 
2 According to social structure of accumulation theorists, the exploration stage represents periods when 
capitalists and state managers attempt to redefine stable conditions for profit making (Prechel 2000: 14) 
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arrangements that occurred in response to the prolonged decline in the rate of capital 
accumulation that was manifested as a debt crisis in 1991.  The turning point3 in India 
was the adoption of neo-liberal reforms in 1991 in order to overcome the debt crisis. 
This turning point had consequences, both for the political-legal institutional 
arrangements that existed and for the firms that were operating within them.  Thus, the 
question that I attempt to answer in the qualitative analysis is twofold:  First, how did the 
ownership structure of Indian firms change from a mixed-system characterized by family 
owned business groups and state-owned enterprises to an economy characterized by a 
combination of domestic and foreign private ownership with substantially fewer state-
owned enterprises?  Second, why did the firms in India resort to a specific strategy of 
corporate growth?  In the following, I will examine how corporate property rights were 
redefined politically as a response to domestic economic conditions and economic 
globalization in each policy period (i.e., 1991-1996, 1997-2001 and 2002-2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 Turning points represent change and are important for understanding historical sequences.  
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Table 2.1 Decay-Exploration Transitions: Economic Organization, Political Party in Power, Dominant Economic Bloc/S,  
and Regulations Governing Mergers and Acquisitions, 1991-2005   
 
Decay -
Exploration 
Periods 
 
Prevailing Economic 
Organization 
 
Political Party 
in Power 
 
Dominant Capitalist Class/es 
 
Regulations Governing Corporate 
Activity/Mergers and Acquisitions 
  
 
1991 - 1996 
 
Mixed: State and  
Capitalist Ownership 
 
Congress  
Minority government 
 
(1) Family-Owned businesses 
  
(2) State-Owned Enterprises 
or Public Sector  
 
(1) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP), 1969-Amended; 
  
(2) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 
1973-Amended 
 
(3) Substantial Acquisition of Shares 
and Takeovers, 1994 
 
 
1997 - 2001 
 
Domestic 
Capitalism 
 
Bharatiya Janata Party 
Coalition government 
 
 
(1) Private sector -   New 
Venture Firms;  
 
(2) Family-Owned Businesses;  
 
(3) Transnational Corporations 
 
 
(1) Takeover Code, 1997 
 
(2) Companies Bill of 1997 
 
(3) Foreign Exchange Management Act 
(FEMA), 1999 
 
 
2002 - 2005 
 
Global Capitalism 
 
Congress 
Coalition government 
 
(1) Private Sector; 
 
(2) Family-Owned Businesses;  
  
(3)Transnational Corporations 
 
Competition Act, 2002 – Revised in 
2003 
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The Case Study 
India is an important case to study for several reasons.  First, India is one of the 
BRIC countries (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China), which are expected to become the 
largest national economies’ in the world.  Second, firms in India earned higher returns 
on equity and invested capital in areas ranging from autos to food products.  The average 
Indian company posted a 16.7% return on capital between 1991 and 2005.  Third, there 
is the increasing presence of multinational corporations and their subsidiaries in India.  
By examining how domestic politics and state structures affected subsequent political-
legal arrangements, the analysis here assesses the extent to which policies implemented 
in India’s financial sector, equity markets and in the area of foreign direct investment 
have been used by businesses to pursue mergers and acquisitions. 
 
 
Historical Context: Political-Legal Arrangements Prior To 1991 
 
Empowered by British colonial rule, the power bloc of large family-owned 
businesses dominated Indian policies up to independence of India.  In the mid-1940s, 
seven family-owned business groups formed a coalition and developed the Bombay 
Plan.  These family-owned business groups recommended a closer relationship between 
domestic private businesses and the state by proposing roles for government and 
business in economic development (Chibber 2003).  Although the Bombay Plan never 
materialized, the significance of this historical event is that it represents an early effort 
by some capitalists to influence and control private property rights by creating a role for 
big business in the policy formation process.  
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After independence in 1947, the Nehru government (Congress) was forced to 
concede to the demands of family-owned businesses.  A key component of political-
legal arrangements was the licensing system that allowed the state to gain monopolistic 
control of key economic sectors.  The licensing system ensured that a list of sectors (i.e., 
coal, telecommunications, power, insurance, mining, oil, etc) were reserved for the state 
and required private-sector businesses to obtain a license from a government oversight 
agency to participate in economic activity (e.g., exports, imports, investments).  Nehru’s 
economic program resulted in establishing state-owned firms to develop the 
infrastructure.   
The State continued to regulate the private sector, especially the increasingly 
powerful family-owned businesses. After Indira Gandhi (Congress) became Prime 
Minister in 1966, she proposed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(MRTP) of 1969. The legislation was set up to prevent the concentration of economic 
power and monopolistic, restrictive and unfair trade practices (Chakravarthy 2001).  
Family-owned businesses lobbied the government for protection from foreign 
corporations and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was passed in 1973.  
One of the key requirements of the FERA legislation was for foreign companies to 
reduce their ownership share to less than 40 percent in Indian companies.  This 
legislation encouraged the development of domestic big business and limited the 
capacity of transnational corporations to set up businesses in India and to merge with or 
acquire Indian corporations.   
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Family-owned businesses continued to align themselves with the ruling party 
(Congress) and used this alliance to influence the policy formation process.  During 
Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister during the 1980s, family-owned businesses 
succeeded in amending the asset limit for companies covered under the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969.  The asset limit for companies was raised five 
times higher than the previous limit. The primary effect of this amendment was to permit 
corporations monitored by the MRTP Commission to expand without government 
supervision (Frankel 2005) and also, facilitate mergers and acquisitions.  The prevailing 
regulatory structure benefitted family-owned businesses by increasing their ownership of 
domestic business enterprises and capacity to establish monopolies.  However, the lack 
of competition perpetuated inefficiencies within this dominant capitalist class.  By the 
late 1980s, India’s economy continued to weaken and many businesses failed to realize a 
profit.   
 
Policy Period I: Economic Crisis and Public Policy Reforms, 1991-1996 
India’s economic crisis deepened as a consequence of Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.  First, the price of oil rose, which resulted in a 
substantial increase in manufacturing costs.  Second, Indian workers in the Persian Gulf 
stopped sending their wages home, which reduced the availability of capital at the 
historical point when India desperately needed it.  Third, investments from Non-Resident 
Indians in the Middle East declined considerably (Ahluwalia 1999:28).  Fourth, the 
termination of exports to Iraq and Kuwait decreased India’s export trade and inflow of 
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foreign capital.  In addition, the decline of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant a rapid 
erosion of trade with India’s primary trade partner. 
In an attempt to keep the economy from falling into a recession, the government 
borrowed heavily from Non-Resident Indian deposits4 and obtained loans from 
commercial banks.  Although this facilitated economic growth, it increased India’s 
external debt, which rose from 12 percent of GDP in 1980-81 to 23 percent of GDP in 
1990-91 (Ahluwalia 1999).  The shortage of capital reserves led to a further tightening of 
restrictions on imports, which resulted in a decline in industrial production dependent on 
imports.  Further, government deficits continued to increase and the country struggled 
under high debt payments.  The primary option available to reduce government debt 
entailed cutting back on infrastructure spending, which would further undermine 
economic growth.   
In addition to the economic crisis, there was a political crisis as well. For the first 
time, the government in 1991 was formed without a majority in the Parliament.  
Narasimha Rao was elected as the Prime Minister of the minority government5.  The 
opposition parties agreed to cooperate with the Rao government on an ‘issue to issue 
basis,’ which created additional opportunities for class and status groups to pursue their 
economic agendas politically.  Rao and his two top ministers, Dr. Manmohan Singh 
                                                        
4
 Non-Resident Indian deposits were set up to encourage Indian workers in foreign countries to 
deposit their savings in Indian banks.  
5 A minority government is formed when no party or coalition establishes a majority (i.e., more than 
half of the total number of seats in Parliament).  In this situation, the party with the highest number of 
votes is given a few days to establish a majority with support from other political parties. 
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(Finance) and Dr. P. Chidambaram (Commerce), considered the prevailing political-
legal arrangements as oppressive, inefficient and unable to deliver quality products 
(Yergin and Stanislaw 1998:219).  A primary agenda of the Rao government was to 
encourage foreign investment by transforming corporate property rights. 
 
Political Reforms to Encourage Corporate Combinations and Foreign Ownership 
The day after Rao took over as Prime Minister, Finance Minister Manmohan 
Singh informed him that India’s deficit was 8 percent of gross domestic product, public 
debt was 55 percent, and interest payment on foreign debt consumed another 4 percent 
(Yergin and Stanislaw 1998:221).  Moreover, the country’s foreign exchange reserves 
covered only two weeks of imports.  To address the deepening economic crisis, a pro-
business coalition within the government that supported previous World Bank and IMF 
initiatives pressured state managers to obtain financial assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).   
India’s neoliberal state managers complied and, in July 1991, Manmohan Singh 
outlined a plan to Parliament to initiate rapid industrialization by devaluing the rupee, 
cutting subsidies for domestic products, and reducing tariffs and trade barriers.  This 
resulted in substantial opposition from conservative Hindu political parties.  In contrast, 
the large family-owned businesses took advantage of this opportunity to criticize state 
managers, and pressured them to implement policies that went beyond those stipulated 
by the IMF.  They argued that the policies should redefine property rights in ways that 
facilitated privatization of the public sector, encouraged competition, facilitated mergers 
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and acquisitions and attracted foreign capital (Kohli 2006a, 2006b). 
The primary target of these reformers was the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act.6  Provisions constraining the concentration of economic power were 
eliminated, which included restrictions requiring prior approval for establishing new 
business ventures, and expanding current businesses through amalgamations, mergers 
and acquisitions.  The new policy also raised the limit for market control to one-fourth of 
the market share (Chakravarthy 2001).  This provision, in most cases, eliminated size as 
a criterion to determine dominance within an economic sector.7  Over time, licenses for 
80 percent of Indian industries were eliminated.   
In order to attract foreign capital, state managers set up additional economic 
reforms that included rupee convertibility8 and removal of restrictions on repatriation of 
dividend income on foreign capital.  This deregulation was designed to facilitate 
integration into the global economy (Andersen 1994:134).  In response to the 
Confederation of Indian Industry business lobby (Sinha 2005), state managers also 
relaxed provisions in the 1973 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) to make it 
more viable for transnational corporations to own and acquire Indian corporations.  The 
                                                        
6
 The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 defined monopoly in terms of assets and 
control over market share.  It required new business ventures and existing companies with assets of more 
than 20 crore rupees (i.e., approximately $4 million) to register with the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission.   
 
7
 Corporations with assets of more than $20 million were still required to register with the (MRTP) 
Commission and firms that were designated as MRTP companies had to obtain permission from the 
MRTP Commission to engage in mergers and acquisitions (Beena 2000).  
8
 Rupee convertibility implies that the Indian rupee can be transferred in to any country’s currency 
without any limitations or control.  A currency is considered to be fully convertible if it can be 
converted into some other currency at the market price of that currency.  
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amended FERA revised property rights in ways that created a mechanism for automatic 
approval of up to 51 percent foreign ownership in 35 high priority, capital-intensive and 
high technology industries (Center for International Trade, Economics and Environment 
and National Council of Applied Economic Research 2002).   
This change in property rights was extremely important because it allowed 
foreign parent companies, for the first time in decades, to establish ownership control 
over Indian firms.  It also allowed them to set up subsidiaries: separate legal entities in 
which the parent company owns more than 50 percent of its stock.  The property 
relationship between parent companies and their subsidiaries provides the parent 
company with the right to exercise ownership control: decision-making authority over 
these legally separate companies (Prechel 2000).  
After these policy changes, the number of domestic mergers and acquisitions 
increased.  In a study of 45 corporate combinations, the majority (i.e., 69 percent) were 
horizontal (i.e., between firms in the same industry) and the remaining combinations 
were divided equally between vertical (i.e., between firms that are complementary to 
each other) and conglomerate (i.e., between firms producing unrelated products) mergers 
and acquisitions (Beena 2000; Kumar 2000:2852).  
 
Deregulation in the Financial Sector 
Prior to 1991, the government owned all the major banks.  State-ownership of 
banks was initiated by the nationalization policy in 1969.  Although the government 
encouraged private ownership of banks, its policy of bailing out poorly performing 
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companies in order to mitigate employment and poverty problems led to state-ownership 
of insolvent and low profit banks.9    By the early 1980s, state-ownership accounted for 
90 percent of total bank deposits.   
By 1979, these conditions resulted in tight credit and restricted access to capital 
and criticism of the Congress Party from the working class and capitalist class fractions.  
In response, the Congress Party began to monitor banks.  The Party also encouraged its 
members who served on the board of directors’ of banks to provide lower interest rates 
to businesses and farmers (Hankla 2006).  In 1974, the Tandon Working Group was 
created by the Central Bank of India.  This group consisted of representatives from other 
banks, financial institutions, and large family-owned businesses.  One of its primary 
agendas was to facilitate the use of bank credit.  In addition, the Credit Authorization 
Scheme required that state-owned banks complete a detailed analysis of businesses 
whenever they attempted to borrow large amounts of capital. 
By 1991, the government began to deregulate interest rates, cut liquidity 
requirements for corporations pursuing external financing, and encouraged private 
ownership of banks (Shirai 2002).  These reform programs also created incentives for 
government-owned banks to place more emphasis on profits.  
 
Political Reforms to Facilitate Equity Financing  
State managers also began to deregulate the amount of equity capital a company 
                                                        
9 By 1992 and 1993, the non-performing assets of 27 public sector banks amounted to 24 percent of 
their total credit.   
 
  
27 
could raise in a stock offering, which was specified under the Capital Issues Control Act 
of 1942.  In 1992, state managers eliminated the 1942 act and replaced the Office of 
Capital Issues with the ‘market-friendly’ Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(Kumar 2000:2851).  Finance Minister Singh maintained that government control over 
capital issues had lost its relevance, and that the new state structure gave companies the 
freedom to raise equity while protecting investors (Varshney 1999:234).  
This deregulation of corporate securities had important implications.  Between 
1990 and 2001, equity finance became one of the largest sources of external capital for 
Indian corporations (Shirai 2002).  Between 1993 and 1995, India underwent a stock 
market boom when many firms raised capital from the equity market.  The number of 
publicly listed firms also increased rapidly from 6683 in 1991 to 8747 in 1995.  The 
share of market capitalization as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) rose 
from 32 percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 1995 (Shirai 2002). 
 
Foreign Ownership  
Together, the extension of transnational corporate property rights governing 
percent of foreign ownership and the deregulation of the securities market resulted in a 
rapid increase in investment by transnational corporations.  Several U.S. Fortune 500 
companies including General Motors, Ford, Merck, Sony, Honda Motors, Coca Cola, 
Hewlett Packard, and Texas Instruments invested in Indian corporations by purchasing 
stock and creating subsidiaries (Ahluwalia 1999:54).  Non-U.S. based transnational 
corporations also acquired Indian companies.  The transnational corporation Hindustan 
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Lever acquired Tata Oil Mills (TOMCO) in 1994 and Lakme in 1995-1996 (Kumar 
2000).  
The flow of portfolio capital (i.e., investment in securities such as stocks, bonds, 
or other financial assets) also increased foreign ownership (Park 2004:3551).10  Foreign 
stock ownership took two primary forms.  First, in 1993, foreign institutional investors 
that met certain minimum standards were allowed to invest in equity and later in debt 
instruments.  Soon, more than 500 foreign institutional investors registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India and approximately 150 began to actively invest 
in Indian firms.  Second, Indian companies were allowed to raise capital by issuing 
global depository receipts,11 which provided a means for foreign portfolio investors to 
purchase stock or invest in joint ventures (Ahluwalia 1999:56).  
Investment from foreign institutional investors and individuals holding global 
depository receipts rose from $4 million in 1991 to $3.6 billion between 1993 and 1994.  
Between 1993 and the end of 1994, foreign investors purchased $2.8 billion of securities 
in Indian corporations.  This amount increased to about $120 million a month in late 
1994.12  
The increasing role of foreign institutional investors has been a source of strain 
                                                        
10
 These changes resulted in a dramatic increase in foreign investment from approximately $2 million 
in 1981 and $26 million in 1990 to around $109 million in 1991 (Rao, Murthy, and Dhar n.d.).  
11 Global depository receipts are certificates issued by an international bank that can be circulated on 
world capital markets.  They facilitate trading of shares, especially those from emerging markets.    
12
 Foreign exchange reserves increased from roughly $1 billion in 1991 to almost $20 billion at the 
end of 1994 (Kumar 2000:2852).   
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for those managing Indian firms.   Indian owners/managers of firms tend to be very 
complacent regarding firm performance and focus on increasing their ownership rather 
than distributing returns to shareholders.   Foreign institutional investors, as compared, 
to the Indian government-controlled financial institutions, place more emphasis on 
corporate performance and corporate governance procedures.   Government-controlled 
financial institutions tend to support management, irrespective of performance while 
foreign institutional investors are geared towards improving or removing inefficient 
management.  Foreign institutional investors are expected to show returns’ on their 
investment whereas government-controlled financial institutions are rarely asked to do 
so.   
 
Property Right Laws and Corporate Form Change 
Changes in India’s political-legal arrangements during this decay-exploration 
phase created the conditions that permitted Indian corporations to restructure as the 
multilayer subsidiary form: a corporation with a hierarchy of two or more levels of 
subsidiary corporations with a parent company at the top of the hierarchy operating as a 
management company (Prechel 2000:12).  Within this corporate form, parent companies 
can organize their entities as subsidiary corporations and establish ownership control 
over them by owning just over 50 percent of their stock. 
This corporate form facilitates mergers and acquisitions in two important ways: 
First, corporations can acquire other corporations or subsidiary corporations by 
purchasing just over 50 percent of their stock to establish ownership control.  This is in 
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contrast to, for example, the multidivisional form, which requires 100 percent ownership 
of a business unit to incorporate it into the company.  Second, because subsidiary 
corporations are legally independent entities, they can issue stock.  This characteristic 
allows parent companies to use their subsidiaries to raise equity capital by issuing 
securities (e.g., stocks, bonds) in them.   
In India, this layered-subsidiary form, also, facilitated foreign investment.  After 
the Industrial Policy Statement of 1991 made several economic sectors eligible for 
automatic approval of up to 51 percent foreign ownership, foreign corporations can 
acquire domestic companies and incorporate them as subsidiaries.  Foreign individuals 
and institutional investors can also easily invest in Indian firms. 
 
 
Policy Period II:  Political Realignments, Redefining Corporate Property Rights 
and Corporate Form Change, 1997-2001 
 In the early 1990s, bribery and other scandals weakened the political base 
of the Congress Party.  Several senior members of the party including Rajiv Gandhi and 
Narasimha Rao were accused of receiving payments from a business group in return for 
securing business contracts for their steel fabrication company (Frankel 2005:690).  The 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) used this opportunity to openly criticize the Congress 
Party’s patronage system and its policies to open the economy to foreign competition 
without providing protections for Indian-owned companies (Nayar 2000:799-800).  The 
BJP distinguished between internal-based liberalization and external-based liberalization 
and advocated for less intervention in the economy, self reliance, and less privilege.  
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Although the BJP won the 1996 general election, it was unable to obtain sufficient 
support to establish a government.   
After an initial period of political instability, a coalition consisting of 13 minority 
regional parties formed a government called the United Front13.  This government 
included an unusual coalition consisting of the pro-labor Communist Party of India 
(M)14 and the right to center pro-business Congress Party.  This political coalition 
emerged because of their shared interest in limiting the growing political power of the 
BJP (Singh 2001; Frankel 2005).  
The BJP continued to build its political support by advocating the Hindu 
philosophy of swadeshi (i.e., self reliance)15 and in 1998 formed a coalition government 
called the National Democratic Alliance, which was in power for only 13 months.  In 
1999, the National Democratic Alliance, under Prime Minister Vajpayee, was reelected 
(Singh 2001).  The National Democratic Alliance coalition modified Rao’s version of 
liberalization and advocated a ‘common minimum program’ (i.e., An Agenda for a 
Proud, Prosperous India), which incorporated the economic objectives of the coalition 
parties.  This alliance marked an important shift from single-party governments to multi-
party coalition governments.  It also entailed a shift in the political orientation of the BJP 
                                                        
13 A coalition government is formed when an alliance among competing parties before the elections 
obtains the necessary number of votes.   
 
14
  In 1964, the Communist Party of India split when the Communist Party of India (M) (i.e., 
Marxists) was formed.  A second division occurred in 1969 when the Communist Party of India (ML) 
(i.e., Marxist-Leninist) split from the Communist Party of India. 
15
 Swadeshi stresses self-reliance and is manifested as encouraging consumption of domestically 
produced goods.  It is also associated with economic nationalism. 
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from Hindu nationalism to representing the economic and secular interests of its political 
base.  
 
Property Right Reforms to Facilitate Corporate Takeovers  
Throughout this period, the Confederation of Indian Industry continued to lobby 
state managers to establish policies favorable to big business.  This business lobby 
pressured the National Democratic Alliance government to reform equity markets.  Their 
primary agenda was to create a political-legal environment to facilitate hostile takeovers 
(“Privatization and Liberalization” 2001).  In a report issued by the Confederation of 
Indian Industry, they argued that takeovers aid economic growth by creating economies 
of scale and scope and increased shareholder value (Dasgupta n.d.).   
In response, state managers established the Bhagwati Commission to review the 
takeover policy.  This Commission recommended deregulating corporate takeovers.  
After this Takeover Code was adopted on February 20, 1997 (Kumar 2000:2851), state 
managers also proposed that the Companies Bill of 1997 replace the Companies Act of 
1956.  The new legislation, if passed, would allow corporations to buy their own stock, 
make capital transfers to subsidiary corporations, and loan capital to other corporations 
without obtaining permission from government oversight agencies.  The new Takeover 
Code also created a mechanism for both hostile and negotiated takeovers, which were 
virtually impossible under previous political-legal arrangements.  It also required target 
companies to register their securities so that they could be easily transferred, irrespective 
of the buyer (Roy, Bakshi, and Ghosal 1997; Reed 2002:257).  In addition, it eliminated 
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the need to obtain government approval of takeovers.16 Together, the Takeover Code and 
the Companies Bill facilitated an increase in mergers and acquisitions.   
 
Redefining Property Right Laws and Increased Foreign Ownership  
To further encourage foreign investment, state managers stipulated that 48 
industries identified in the Industrial Policy Statement of 1991 were eligible for 
automatic approval of up to 51 percent foreign ownership.  In the following year, the 
limit on automatic approval of foreign ownership was raised from 51 to 74 percent in 
nine categories of industries (Indian Economic Survey 1997-1998).  Foreign ownership 
was further facilitated by permitting 100 percent foreign ownership in economic sectors 
that were designated as crucial to economic growth that were not included in the 
automatic approval regulation.  Deregulation also permitted transnational corporations to 
own 100 percent of joint ventures, if an Indian partner was not available and the firm 
divested at least 26 percent of its equity in three to five years.  In addition, the limit on 
foreign portfolio (e.g., stock) ownership was raised from 24 to 30 percent, and later to 40 
percent in most business sectors that were not previously deregulated.  Also, the ceiling 
on the equity holding of a single foreign institutional investor was raised from five to 10 
percent (“Privatization and Liberalization” 2001).   
                                                        
16
 Also, under the previous corporate law, corporate raiders had to apply to the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India for permission to ensure that the competitive bid was beneficial to the target 
company.  In some cases such as Bombay Dyeing’s attempt to compete with Torrent Group to 
acquire Ahmedabad Electricity Company, this takeover attempt was blocked by the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India.  
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The Confederation of Indian Industry lobby continued to pressure state managers 
to further weaken the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, which regulated foreign 
ownership of domestic firms.  In 1999, when the National Democratic Alliance Party 
replaced the United Front government, it eliminated the Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act and created the Foreign Exchange Management Act (Ahluwalia 1999:52; “What 
FEMA” 2000) in 1999.  This legislation opened virtually all economic sectors to foreign 
corporate and individual investors.   
After corporate property rights were redefined to eliminate most restrictions on 
foreign ownership in most economic sectors, several critical changes occurred.  First, 
many corporations restructured as the multilayer subsidiary form.  Second, foreign 
individuals, institutional investors and corporations increased their ownership of Indian 
parent companies and subsidiaries through takeovers, joint ventures and/or purchase of 
securities.  Third, other business policies established free-trade zones, which provide 
transnational corporations with state-subsidized operating facilities.  Between 1995 and 
1998, foreign investment in India increased from approximately $654 million to $3.682 
billion (see Figure 2.1).   
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Figure 2.1 Foreign Direct Investments in India, 1991-2005 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry-Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion 
 
 
Redefining Bank Laws and Increased Foreign Debt 
Despite the extensive transformation in India’s organizational and political-legal 
arrangements, advocates of the neoliberal model inside and outside the state lobbied to 
further deregulate the banking sector.  The Confederation of Indian Industry continued to 
be among the most politically active lobby group.17  Subsequent changes in banking 
                                                        
17
 Also, during a visit to the United States in 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee requested an infusion of 
foreign capital of $10 billion annually (Frankel 2005:728).   
Foreign Direct Investment in India, 1991-2005 
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laws included the Monetary and Credit Policy Act of 1997, which relaxed restrictions on 
bank financing and laid the foundation for the integration of Indian currency and foreign 
exchange markets (Roy et al. 1997).  This legislation also allowed banks to determine 
corporations’ working capital requirements and to assess their risk levels.  In addition, 
the government deregulated the guidelines governing the issuance of commercial paper.  
By making it easier to access debt financing, this change facilitated the use of private 
debt and commercial paper to mitigate corporations’ capital dependence (Kamesam 
n.d.).18 
The Confederation of Indian Industry also lobbied the government to require 
financial institutions to sell their stock in corporations.  This corporate lobby criticized 
the current political-legal arrangement where financial institutions (e.g., commercial 
banks, public financial institutions) were agents of the government.  They argued that 
government-controlled financial institutions could not properly monitor firms because 
they had a conflict of interest as both creditors and shareholders, and this relationship 
permitted financial institutions to support corporate management, irrespective of 
performance.  To resolve this conflict of interests, they advocated for decreased 
government ownership (Dasgupta n.d.; also see Roy et al. 1997). 
In response, state managers further deregulated the financial sector of the 
economy.  In 1998, the government allowed banks and financial institutions to finance 
                                                        
18 Whereas commercial paper is low-risk short-term unsecured debt, private debt entails the sale of 
debt or securities to investors.  The capital obtained from the sale of debt can be used to finance 
acquisitions and other expenses.  
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acquisitions through bonds or debentures (Dasgupta n.d.). The new provisions also made 
it possible for corporations to borrow against their securities and commercial paper.  
This policy made it viable to set up leveraged buyout funds and transfer capital among 
corporate entities inside the same corporation.  During the same period, state managers 
passed legislation (e.g., Income Tax Act), which lowered corporate taxes by reducing the 
peak depreciation rate, reducing the capital gains tax from 20 percent to 10 percent, and 
removing taxes on corporate restructuring (e.g., mergers, acquisitions) (Roy et al. 1997).  
Whereas the previous legislation taxed capital transfer in mergers, the revised policy 
exempted companies that were either the target or the acquirer from this tax.  Also, if 
both target and acquirer are Indian companies, the shareholders were exempt from 
paying a tax (Ramanujam 2006).   
The business lobby also pressured state managers to reduce the size requirement 
of initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock.  They argued that this law was biased against 
small and medium-sized firms’ because it restricted their capacity to raise capital in the 
equity market (e.g., public stock offering) (Shirai 2002).  In 1999, the Kumar Mangalam 
Birla Committee, which was appointed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(Som 2006:4156), recommended deregulating IPOs for information technology firms.  
This change in the regulatory structure is important because it allowed corporations to 
restructure their smaller corporate units as legally independent subsidiary corporations 
and raise capital by issuing stock in them.  Following these changes, IPOs rapidly 
increased and India underwent a stock market boom; market capitalization as a 
percentage of gross domestic product rose from 34 percent in 1999 to 85 percent in 2000 
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(Shirai 2002).  The particular form of deregulation in India paralleled those that occurred 
in the United States in the previous decade (Prechel 2000).   
These new property right laws created incentives for corporations to change to 
the multilayer subsidiary form.  First, eliminating the tax on corporate restructuring 
reduced the cost of transforming to this layered-subsidiary form.  Second, eliminating 
taxes on the distribution of profits via dividends reduced operating costs in this corporate 
form.  Third, the deregulation of stock offerings made it possible to raise equity capital 
by issuing stock in smaller subsidiary corporations. This corporate form change, in turn, 
facilitated an increase in mergers and acquisitions by making it easier for corporations to 
raise capital internally to finance restructuring strategies.  
 
 
Policy Period III: The Merger and Acquisition Wave, 2002-2005 
 
Although big business began to lobby for changes in the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act in 1999, they increased their lobby efforts in response to 
the economic recession in 2001 that followed the stock market boom (Goswami 2000).  
Foreign corporate consultants including KPMG advised their clients that “a slump in the 
economy is a good time to consolidate” (Maitra and Jayakar 2001).  However, the 
capacity of foreign corporations to acquire businesses was still constrained in some 
economic sectors by the regulatory environment that required domestic ownership 
control of corporations. 
Beginning in May 2000, the business lobby maintained that further modification 
of corporations’ political-legal environment was necessary to facilitate mergers and 
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acquisitions.  The corporate lobby pressured state managers to restructure several 
dimensions of the political-legal environment in which corporations are embedded.  
First, was to create a new regulatory body named the Competition Commission of India 
(CCI) to process merger applications.  Second, was to notify the CCI about proposed 
mergers where the assets of the merged entity exceed 500 crore Rupees (i.e., $102 
million), or when the assets of a subsidiary that is proposing a merger exceed 2000 crore 
Rupees (i.e., $410 million).  Third, was to give the CCI 90 days from date of the 
application to either accept or reject the merger.  Fourth, was to exclude predatory 
pricing as a criterion to prohibit the combination because lower prices can benefit 
consumers.19  Fifth, was to make agreements between competitors (i.e., horizontal 
integration) and between buyers and sellers (i.e., vertical integration) subject to the law.   
Sixth, was to ensure that combinations involving state monopolies and foreign 
companies are subject to examination and approval by the Commission (Dasgupta n.d.).   
These recommendations were supported by the pro-business Finance Minister, 
Jaswant Singh of the BJP, who maintained that the new policy would enable domestic 
companies to grow and compete in the global economy (“Competition Bill” 2002).  In 
January 2003, the revisions to the Competition Act were adopted by the President of 
India (Agarwal 2005; Dasgupta n.d.).   
Additional concessions to business further weakened government oversight by 
permitting large corporations to voluntarily notify the Commission of most kinds of 
                                                        
19
 The Act defined combinations as mergers, amalgamations, and acquisition of shares, voting rights 
or assets and acquisitions of control.   
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combination.20  To justify these changes, the Competition Commission maintained that 
market share is a necessary but insufficient condition to determine dominance because 
firms with large market shares’ can face competition from potential entrants, existing 
firms, or the purchasing power of customers.  The Competition Commission redefined 
market dominance of a firm as “the economic strength to behave, to an appreciable 
extent, independently of its competitors and customers” (Department of Company 
Affairs n.d.).  The clause ‘to an appreciable extent’ is particularly important because it 
makes market dominance open to interpretation.  Now, the primary criteria defining 
market dominance were the assets of the merged entities.  The effect of this policy was 
to exclude from government oversight corporate combinations by large domestic and 
transnational corporations that control a substantial market share (Dasgupta n.d.).21  
Restrictions on the percentage of foreign ownership were completely eliminated 
in some economic sectors during this policy period.   In 1999 and 2000, the government 
enacted policy that permitted 100 percent foreign ownership in some private sectors such 
as information technology businesses’ that focused primarily on exports (Panagariya 
2005:15).  The foreign ownership limit was also raised in aviation, banking, telecom, 
and real estate (“Deal Tracker” 2005) and in industries that were previously in the public 
                                                        
20
 Following these policy changes, mergers and acquisitions increased in key economic sectors such 
as petroleum and banking.  For example, Reliance Industries, India’s biggest private sector firm 
acquired a petroleum unit in a stock transaction.  
21 In addition, the Securities and Exchange Board of India revised the amended Takeover Code in 
2002 to deregulate the acquisition of significant shareholdings, takeovers, share buy-backs, and 
insider trading (Som 2006:4156).  Following these changes, the volume of securities issuances (e.g., 
stocks and bonds) rapidly increased.  The largest increase in stock equity issuance occurred in 2002, 
which was more than two times higher than the previous peak in 1995 (Indian Economic Survey 
2004-2005). 
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sector (e.g., insurance, pharmaceuticals, high demand consumer goods) (“Cross-Border 
M&As” 2005).22  
 
Deregulation in the Banking Sector 
Continued deregulation of finance in the first decade of the 20th century 
eliminated many distinctions between banks and financial institutions.  Many of India’s 
public sector financial institutions were transformed into commercial banks or non-
banking financial corporations.  After state managers enacted the Transfer of 
Undertaking and Repeal Act, the Industrial Development Bank of India incorporated as a 
private corporation.  Similarly, the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India 
(ICICI) incorporated as ICICI Bank in 2002.  Again, like deregulation in the United 
States (Prechel 2000), these new business policies allowed financial institutions to offer 
a wider array of financial products and services to individual customers (Daily Times 
2002).   
In 2005, deregulation of the financial sector increased the ceiling on foreign 
ownership in banks from 49 to 74 percent, which permitted foreign banks to establish 
subsidiaries in India (Indian Economic Survey 2004-2005).  Because foreign banks had 
access to more capital and advanced technologies than many Indian banks, they quickly 
                                                        
22
 Deregulation in some industries was the outcome of a long-term strategy.  For example, the 1994 
National Telecommunications Policy opened up cellular as well as basic and value-added telephone 
services to foreign investors (Panagariya 2005:15).  In February 2005, the ceiling on ownership of 
services in the entire telecom sector was raised from 49 percent to 74 percent (Indian Economic 
Survey 2004-05).  Moreover, investment in certain internet services was raised to 100 percent foreign 
ownership.  State managers also allowed 100 percent foreign direct investment in e-commerce.  
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increased their presence both in terms of numbers and market share.  Whereas 148 
foreign banks were located in India in 1990, this number increased to 259 in 2005.  Also, 
new limits on credit financing increased the availability of credit to private industry and 
other economic sectors.  Following these changes, the use of credit in medium and large 
industries increased from five to more than 17 percent in 2004 and 2005.  In 2005, credit 
in the industrial sector rose to 46 percent (Mehrotra 2006:9).   
 
The Effects of Deregulation on Mergers and Acquisitions and Foreign Ownership 
The changes described here created the organizational and political-legal 
arrangements that permitted rapid change in ownership of Indian firms.  Prior to passage 
of the Takeover Code in 1994, the majority of mergers and acquisitions (i.e., 
approximately 80 percent) were by Indian companies (Raju and Deepthi 2004).23  
Deregulation in the second policy period was followed by several changes in merger and 
acquisition activity.  
In the 1980s, approximately 60 percent of the mergers and acquisitions were in 
the manufacturing sector, 32 percent were in the tertiary sector (e.g., 
telecommunications, power generation, consulting services), and less than 10 percent 
were in the primary sector (e.g., agriculture, mining, petroleum).  Moreover, most 
mergers and acquisitions were domestic.  In contrast, mergers by transnational 
                                                        
23
 The finance, metal and information-technology industries, which accounted for about 37 percent of 
total takeovers, are relatively small companies.  As expected, capital-intensive industries accounted 
for the largest deal value.  The petrochemical industry was first with 13.6 percent, followed by 
electronics and electrical with 13.2 percent and metal with 11.9 percent.   
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corporations steadily increased in the early 1990s and accelerated in the second half of 
the decade (see Figure 1.1).  Between 1994 and 1997, nearly 40 percent of cross-border 
investment by transnational corporations occurred through mergers and acquisitions.  
Moreover, in contrast to the 1980s, the tertiary sector accounted for more than 60 
percent of transnational mergers and acquisitions and mergers in the manufacturing 
sector fell to below 40 percent (Kong and Sakthivel 2004:34).  Foreign direct investment 
in the tertiary sector rose from 5.2 percent in the 1990s to 58.7 percent between 1991 
and 1997 (Park 2004:3552).   
Subsequent deregulation was followed by further increases in mergers and 
acquisitions.  After the Competition Act was revised in 2003, merger and acquisition 
activity increased by more than 100 percent in the following year (see Figure 2.2).  Also, 
the size of the largest deals increased from $5.11 billion in 2003 to $12.3 billion in 2004.  
The largest number of corporate combinations occurred in the technology sector 
followed by healthcare, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.  In 2005, China was the 
only other Asian country with more mergers and acquisitions (Ramanujam 2006).  In 
addition to mergers and acquisitions by transnational corporations, several family-owned 
business groups pursued mergers and acquisitions, organized these companies as 
subsidiaries, and incorporated them into the multilayer subsidiary form.  Rayon 
corporation (i.e., part of the Aditya Birla Group) established ownership control of PSI 
Data Systems in July 2001 by acquiring just over 50 (i.e., 50.35) percent of its stock 
(Varadarajan 2001).  The embeddedness of the layered-subsidiary form in these 
political-legal arrangements allowed Rayon to increase its expertise in the crucial and 
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expanding software development segment of the economy through simple stock 
transactions and incorporating the acquired companies as subsidiaries.   
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Similarly, after deregulation, the Birla and Tata family-owned business merged 
with AT&T to create one of the largest communication corporations in India.  Then, in 
anticipation of the enactment of the 2002 Competition Act, two of the largest firms in 
the telecommunication industry, BPL Communications and Birla-Tata AT&T agreed to 
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merge.  This multilayer subsidiary corporation created the country’s largest cellular 
service joint-venture company in India.  According to the vice-chairman of JP Morgan 
Stanley, who was a financial advisor to the merger, “the consolidation took place in 
order to increase scale, cost effectiveness and the creation of a larger resource base” 
(Maitra and Jayakar 2001).  Deregulation had important benefits for large corporations; 
the extensive resource base of the parent company increases their capacity to raise 
capital from debt and equity markets.  This gave them a clear advantage over smaller 
companies. 
Foreign ownership also increased during this period of deregulation (see Figure 
2.2).  During the first policy period (1991-1996), the number of mergers and acquisitions 
of Indian companies by transnational corporations gradually increased from four in the 
year prior to deregulation (1990) to 93 in 1995.  The second policy period (1997-2001), 
which included adoption of the new Takeover Code in 1997, resulted in a rapid upswing 
in mergers and acquisitions that reached 268 in 2000.  After a downturn in the number of 
mergers and acquisitions in the third policy period (2002-2005), which included the 
Competition Act, foreign mergers and acquisitions reached a record high of 283 in 2005.  
As Figure 2.2 shows, transnational corporations rapidly increased their ownership of 
Indian corporations during this period of rapid deregulation. 
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Findings 
The analysis here shows that big business mobilized politically to change the 
political-legal arrangements in which corporations are embedded in order to advance 
their capital accumulation agendas.  These political-legal changes were followed by a 
rapid increase in mergers and acquisitions.  Whereas the average annual number of 
mergers and acquisitions between 1973 and 1990 was approximately 32, after the 
economic crisis and initial deregulation between 1991 and 1995, they increased to 90.  
After the stock market decline and further deregulation, the average number of mergers 
and acquisitions per year increased to 156 between 1996 and 2003 (see Figure 1.1).24   
Some of the specific findings of this historical-qualitative analysis served as a 
basis for the variables selected in the quantitative analysis:  First, mergers and 
acquisitions increased with the adoption of neo-liberal reforms.  Deregulation of the 
economy changed the non-competitive environment of Indian firms, by attracting new 
venture and foreign capital.  Companies in India were forced to consolidate their 
position in the industry or face the risk of being taken over by another firm.  In 1990, the 
Indian economy was dominated by family-owned corporations and state-owned 
enterprises.  By 2006, foreign individuals and corporations owned stock in more than 
1,000 Indian companies, and 125 U.S. Fortune 500 companies had set up research and 
development subsidiaries in India (Das 2006). 
                                                        
24
 The rapid increase in mergers and acquisitions during this drop in the stock market is consistent 
with previous analyses, which shows that weak or unpredictable markets deter capitalists from 
making investments in new productive capacity.  Under these conditions, corporations pursue mergers 
and acquisitions in order to consolidate existing productive capacity (Prechel and Boies 1998:332). 
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Second, corporate consolidation was facilitated by the multilayer subsidiary form 
because it reduces the cost of mergers and acquisitions.  Instead of purchasing 100 
percent of a firm, parent companies can establish ownership control by purchasing just 
over 50 percent of the stock in a company and incorporate it as a subsidiary corporation.  
Also, it allowed management to raise foreign equity capital by issuing stock in their 
subsidiary corporations.  This corporate form made it easier for foreign individuals, 
institutional investors, and corporations to invest in Indian corporations because they can 
purchase stock in the parent company or its many subsidiary corporations.   
Third, mergers and acquisitions increased with the deregulation of financial and 
equity sectors.  New state structures gave companies the freedom to raise equity, both 
domestic and foreign, while protecting investors. Between 1990 and 2001, equity 
finance became one of the largest sources of external capital for Indian corporations 
(Shirai 2002).  The decrease in government ownership and privatization of banks and 
financial institutions made it possible for corporations to access private debt and 
commercial paper to mitigate their capital dependence.  In addition, banks and financial 
institutions were permitted to finance acquisitions through bonds or debentures 
(Dasgupta n.d.).  While the amount of equity finance raised has been large, Indian firms 
are still dependent on debt to finance their ventures. For the year ending March 2002, 
external financing accounted for 56 percent of total corporate funds raised, with slightly 
more than two–fifths of this from capital markets (including bonds and debentures). The 
average debt-to-equity ratio for Indian companies was at 1.2 in 1996 which then 
increased to 1.4 in 2002, close to the 1990 level (Topalova 2004).  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
This chapter develops hypotheses for the research on mergers and acquisitions 
with two goals in mind. The first is to identify those factors that are considered to be 
important in explaining a firm’s decision to be an acquirer within previous literature.  
The second is to develop hypotheses that will be tested in the current study. There are 
relatively few sociological studies of mergers and acquisitions in India.  Researchers, 
who have examined mergers and acquisitions in India and elsewhere, mostly tend to 
follow the economic efficiency model.1   
 
Previous Research on Mergers and Acquisitions 
The focus of most Indian research is on examining the relationship between 
economic conditions or corporate financial characteristics and merger and acquisition 
activity. Studies have analyzed the characteristics of mergers in terms of the structure of 
mergers, nature of mergers, which firms are likely to be acquiring, the role of foreign 
direct investment, and the role of acquisitions in the growth of assets and sources of 
financing growth (Beena 2000; Kumar 2000; Dasgupta n.d.).  An economic rationale is 
then used to explain these characteristics.  For example, Beena (2000:31) suggested that 
                                                        
1
 Research on mergers and acquisitions in the United States has examined the reasons behind the economic 
efficiency of mergers. They observed the relationship between economic conditions and merger activity 
(Steiner 1975; Melicher, Ledolter, and D’Antonio 1983; Becketti 1986; Golbe and White 1988). 
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restructuring occurred because of two reasons: First, consolidation was aimed at 
increasing size, to derive marketing advantages and to obtain financial benefits for 
shareholders.  Second, production plans were linked to those of related firms (i.e., to 
obtain synergy that is associated with vertical mergers).   
A common feature of the studies is the use of financial ratios to predict corporate 
takeovers (Beena 2000; Kaur 2002).  The studies concluded that the main motives for 
mergers and acquisitions is economic: (1) to increase the equity size that can be used to 
borrow resources for modernization (Beena 2000; Kaur 2002); (2) to achieve economies 
of scale; (3) to gain efficiency through synergies; (4) to minimize risk through 
diversification; and (5) to achieve short-term financial gains from imperfect capital and 
foreign exchange markets (Bhoi 2000).   
Although research on Indian corporations has examined the relationship between 
mergers and acquisitions and the external environment, insufficient attention has been 
given to historical transitions2 in the political-legal environment of corporations.  That is, 
they tend to view certain periods, for example, the “takeover period” (Kaur 2002) or 
“increase in foreign direct investment period” (Kumar 2000) as isolated events rather 
than viewing them as interdependent sequences of events.  In addition, these studies do 
not examine departures from previous regulatory environments.  Further, extant research 
lacks in systematically analyzing the reasons behind firms’ merger and acquisition 
activity in the post-liberalization era, specifically, the period after 2000.    
Sociologists examining mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. have shown that 
                                                        
2
 According to Abbott (1997), transitions are stages along historical trajectories and radical shifts.  
Trajectories refer to interlocked and interdependent sequences of events that produce patterned action-
orientations.   
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network and institutional variables affect merger activity.  Studies have analyzed the role 
of financial institutions (Stearns 1986), regulatory influences and changes in the political 
and economic environment (Fligstein 1990; Stearns and Allan 1996; Dobbin and Dowd 
2000; Morris 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007), inter-corporate networks and organizational 
imitation (Haunschild 1993), and relations between owners and managers and intra-elite 
relationships (Davis and Stout 1992; Palmer et al. 1995; Palmer and Barber 2001).  
Studies have also examined which organizations are likely to be acquired (Davis and 
Stout 1992; Palmer et al. 1995; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Wheelock and Wilson 2000; 
Morris 2000, 2004, 2005) and which firms are likely to be acquiring organizations 
(Pfeffer 1972; Haunschild 1993; Palmer and Barber 2001; Wheelock and Wilson 2002; 
Morris 2000, 2004, 2005).   
The limited research on mergers and acquisitions among firms in India from a 
sociological perspective limits my capacity to explain the process, while presenting 
several research opportunities.  First, mergers and acquisitions from a sociological 
perspective have been studied, predominantly, by researchers in developed economies.  
Since the dynamics of organizational change are different in emerging economies3, this 
study is exploratory in nature i.e., it is an attempt to examine which of the organizational 
theories’ in sociology and variables will best explain the case of mergers and 
acquisitions among Indian firms.  Second, this study moves beyond previous studies on 
                                                        
3
 According to Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright (2000), an emerging economy is defined as a country 
that meets two conditions: a rapid rate of development in the economy and state policies that favor 
economic liberalization and the adoption of a free-market system.   
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merger and acquisition activity, which tend to draw primarily on economic theories and 
focus on efficiency.4    
 
Hypotheses Relating to Mergers and Acquisitions 
In this section, I develop hypotheses from the resource dependence perspective 
that addresses mergers and acquisitions.  I provide a brief outline of the general 
propositions of resource dependence theory and the ways in which firm-level variables 
can be integrated into the theory’s explanation of organizational change.  I then derive 
hypotheses to explain a firm’s decision to acquire another firm during the three policy 
periods (i.e., 1991 to 1996, 1997 to 2001 and 2002 to 2005).   
Resource dependence theory is appropriate to study mergers and acquisitions in 
emerging markets because firms and the environments’ in which they are located are 
characterized by a scarcity of resources.  Emerging markets are characterized by “poorly 
developed financial markets, weak institutions for the distribution of capital, volatile 
economic development and low availability and high cost of capital” (Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle and Borza 2000).  Firms in emerging markets have to obtain resources 
in order to maintain their competitive advantages and thereby, ensure their survival. 
When discussing mergers and acquisitions, it is important to understand the 
definition of the acquiring firm in the transaction process.  The acquiring firm is the one 
that attempts to buy another firm.  The acquiring firm is one in which its charter or 
identity continues following the merger or acquisition transaction (Morris 2000, 2005).   
                                                        
4The research questions asked in previous studies on mergers and acquisitions in India have been 
economic or financial in nature or of significance to strategic management. 
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Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory conceptualizes organizations to be pro-active in 
attempting to deal with the uncertainties in their environment. Organizations are pro-
active in that they attempt to “alter the system of constraints or dependence confronting 
the organization” rather than merely reacting to the uncertainties in obtaining resources 
in their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:267). Thus, the theory has a strong 
conception of social action.  By social action, I refer to action taken by firms (i.e., social 
actors) to bring about change in their strategy or structure5.   Thus, “the way by which 
this theory explains social action is useful in understanding how it conceptualizes 
organizational change” (Morris 2000).   
There are two dimensions of resource dependence theory that I use to explain 
organizational change.  First, since the primary purpose of organizations is to survive6, 
the scarcity of resources (i.e., capital) within the organization and the competition for 
resources in the external environment constitute constraints to which an organization 
will be forced to respond (Pfeffer 1972, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  Second, an 
organization, by controlling certain resources, is able to reduce its resource dependence 
on other organizations in the environment and thereby, undertake change.  A firm, both 
by, possessing and controlling certain resources and enforcing rules regarding access to 
scarce resources is able to increase its leverage in inter-organizational relationships 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).   
                                                        
5
 Organizational change includes change in both the strategy and structure of the organization (Chandler 
1962). For purposes of this dissertation, I will refer to the change in strategy (i.e., mergers and 
acquisitions) among organizations.  
 
6
 Resource dependence theory contends that the ultimate goal of the organization is to survive. 
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The focus of the theory is on the interdependencies that occur through resource 
exchange between an organization and other groups in its environment (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1972)7.   Since internal and external constraints on the availability 
of capital constitute uncertainty for the organization in terms of access to resources, they 
will alter their structure and patterns of behavior as a response to these constraints.   
According to Prechel (2000), organizational characteristics such as financial instability 
and small size threaten the survival of the organization and this leads to organizational 
change.  In order to reduce or avoid uncertainty, organizations work towards achieving 
two objectives: First, they attempt to acquire control over resources that will minimize 
their dependence on others.  Second, they try to obtain resources that will maximize the 
dependence of other organizations on them (Ulrich and Barney 1984).      
Capital is one among many resources that is crucial to the survival of the 
organization. The qualitative analysis found that Indian companies were highly 
leveraged, had low cash flows and were highly inefficient because of the protectionist 
policies of the State prior to the adoption of neo-liberal reforms in 1991.  Debt, declining 
earnings and inefficiency will be used as variables to measure the capital dependence of 
a firm and assess their effect on change in strategy among organizations.  The use of 
number of subsidiaries as a variable is to understand whether firms that transformed to 
                                                        
7
 In order to achieve stability and predictability in organization-environment relationships, firms grow 
(Katz and Kahn 1966) and one form of growth is through merging with or acquiring another organization 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:114).  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) talk about three kinds of mergers.  Vertical 
mergers represent a method of obtaining control over resources that are vital to the operation of the firm.  
Horizontal mergers represent a way of achieving dominance to increase the power of the firm in exchange 
relationships and to reduce uncertainty generated from competition.  Diversification represents a method 
of decreasing the dependence of the firm on other dominant organizations.   
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the multilayer subsidiary form (as revealed by the qualitative analysis) were more likely 
to acquire.  
 
Debt and Acquisitions  
Debt lowers the amount of investment capital available to a corporation (Prechel 
and Boies 1998:336; Prechel 1997a, 1997b).  This condition constrains the capacity of 
management to finance future investments.  The interest payment associated with high 
debt can reduce the profit levels of a firm and also, threaten a corporation’s chances of 
survival by limiting cash flow and restricting access to capital with low interest rates 
(Prechel, Morris, Woods, and Walden 2008:863).  Firms in India were excessively 
leveraged (i.e., having more debt as compared to equity) at beginning of the reform 
process (i.e., 1991) because of two factors.  First, institutional finance was highly 
subsidized and firms took on as much debt as was permissible. Second, the risks 
involved in operating a business in a protected economy were low and thus, firms could 
take more risks on the financial side (Varma 1998)8.   
Some researchers have used the variable of capital dependency to explain 
acquisitions in the banking industry (Morris 2000, 2004, 2005; Wheelock and Wilson 
2000, 2002).  Morris, in her study, found that capital constraints faced by a bank was the 
only variable to have a consistent effect on change in strategy and structure among banks 
across policy environment periods.  A bank with high debt levels faces the risk of being 
                                                        
8
 The total corporate debt of developing countries of the East Asia and Pacific region grew at a compound 
annual rate of 16 percent between the end of 1990 and the end of 1997.  The debt-equity ratio, valued at 
the market price of equity, rose from 3.8 at the end of 1990 to 4.2 at the end of 1997 (Ratha, Mohapatra 
and Suttle 2003).   
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taken over by a regulator and thus, undertakes a merger and/or acquisition.  A firm with 
high debt levels faces the risk of losing its equity capital because shareholders might 
threaten to sell their stocks if they do not get a good return on their investment.  
According to Haunschild (1993), a firm with more debt compared to equity was more 
likely to undertake vertical and conglomerate acquisitions.  Thus, a firm with high debt 
is more likely to acquire another firm.  
Hypothesis 1: A firm with high debt is more likely to acquire another firm in order to 
overcome its capital dependence.  
 
Declining Earnings and Acquisitions  
Earnings are an indication that a firm has cash flow to re-invest in projects and 
serves as a buffer against uncertainties in the environment.  For an investor, earnings are 
important because they give an indication of the company's expected future dividends 
and its potential for growth and capital appreciation.   
Declining earnings are manifested as higher capital dependence (Morris 2000; 
Wheelock and Wilson 2000, 2002).  In order to reduce capital dependence, a firm with 
low earnings will undertake an acquisition with the expectation that the transaction will 
increase its future profits and will improve its market valuation9.   Based on resource 
dependence theory’s proposition that constraints on capital promote organizational 
                                                        
9
 Agency theorists maintain that excess free cash flow (i.e., cash flow in excess of what is required to 
finance profitable investment opportunities) subjects managers to opportunistic behavior (Jensen 1986).  
Managers make unprofitable investments in order to retain their positions rather than reward shareholders 
with dividends and stock buy-backs.   
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change, a firm with low earnings is more likely to undertake an acquisition in order to 
improve its financial position.   
Hypothesis 2: A firm with declining earnings is more likely to acquire another firm in 
order to overcome its capital dependence. . 
 
 
Inefficiency and Acquisitions 
 
 A firm is considered to be efficient if it produces an output with minimum 
amount of waste, expenses and effort.  According to Chandler (1962), efficiency is 
defined as ratio of inputs like labor and raw material to outputs (p.37).  Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) contend that the efficient allocation of resources within an organization 
is a measure of how well the organization is performing10.  An organization has to 
efficiently allocate resources in order to gain acceptance or social legitimacy from the 
external environment; given the fact that organizations are dependent on the external 
environment for survival.  According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), this involves the 
issue of effectiveness. Effectiveness represents an “external standard of how well an 
organization is meeting the demands of the various groups and organizations that are 
concerned with its activities” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 11)11.  Thus, a firm that is 
inefficient will also be ineffective in obtaining resources from the external environment.  
                                                        
10
 Indian businesses experienced major changes in profitability during the period 1989–2002.  In the 
second half of the 1990s, profitability declined to levels in the pre-reform period (Topalova 2004).  Prior 
to deregulation, lack of competition allowed many of the state-owned enterprises and family-owned 
businesses to operate inefficiently. 
 
11
 The reason for not focusing on transaction cost economics in this analysis is because it has a weak 
conception of social action. According to transaction cost economics, efficiency is the main and only 
systematic factor responsible for the organizational changes that have occurred (Williamson 1975). 
Organizations are conceptualized as reacting to their environment by changing themselves to absorb 
transactions to become more efficient.   
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 Inefficiencies in the allocation of resources constitute an internal constraint to 
which an organization is forced to respond12.  Thus, a firm that is inefficient is more 
likely to undertake an acquisition in order to overcome internal and external constraints 
on resource availability.    
Hypothesis 3: A firm that is inefficient is more likely to acquire another firm in order to 
overcome its capital dependence.  
 
 
Subsidiaries and Acquisitions 
 
According to resource dependence theory, the control of certain resources helps a 
firm to deal with uncertainties in the environment.   For example, a firm with more 
assets (i.e., organizational size) is more likely to grow because it is not dependent on 
other organizations in the environment for resources.  Size cushions the organization 
against failure and also, increases the dependence of other organizations on it.  On a 
similar note, a firm with more subsidiaries is better able to handle uncertainties in the 
environment.  According to Mudambi and Pederson (2007), units (i.e., subsidiaries) that 
control resources are strategic in terms of managing critical relationships between the 
firm and its environment. 
Theorists have shown the strength of the resource dependence framework in 
explaining change in the structure of organizations (Prechel 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Prechel 
and Boies 1998; Prechel, Boies and Woods 1999). Corporations changed from the 
multidivisional to the multilayer subsidiary form to reduce their dependence on debt 
                                                        
12
 In a study of the relationship between efficiency and acquisition activity, it was found that efficient 
firms tend to acquire less than inefficient firms (Leverty and Qian 2009).   
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financing; in contrast to divisions, management could issue stock in their subsidiaries 
(Prechel 2000).   
The multilayer subsidiary form facilitates mergers and acquisitions in two 
important ways:  First, corporations can acquire other corporations or subsidiary 
corporations by purchasing just over 50 percent of their stock to establish ownership 
control.  This is in contrast to, for example, the multidivisional form, which requires 100 
percent ownership of a business unit to incorporate it into the company.  Second, 
because subsidiary corporations are legally independent entities, they can issue stock.  
This characteristic allows parent companies to use their subsidiaries to raise equity 
capital by issuing securities (e.g., stocks, bonds) in them.   
Prechel, Boies and Woods (1999), found a significant relationship between a 
company changing from a multidivisional form to a multilayer subsidiary form and 
merging and acquiring.  On a similar note, the number of first-level subsidiaries of a firm 
was significantly related to their diversification strategies (Prechel et al. 2008).  This is 
because a subsidiary is an independent unit by itself and helps the parent company to 
overcome some of the constraints of depending on external capital markets.  In India, 
firms adopted the multilayer subsidiary form when several restrictions on foreign 
ownership in most economic sectors were removed.  Therefore, a firm that changes to 
the multilayer subsidiary form is more likely to acquire another company.   
Hypothesis 4: A firm with more subsidiaries is more likely to acquire another firm.    
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Age, Size, Intra-industry M&As and Acquisition Activity 
 I have included age of the firm, size of the firm and intra-industry mergers and 
acquisitions as controls as organizational theories consider them vital to explain 
acquisition activities of firms.   However, the findings from previous research conflict 
over their relationship to organizational change.  
The size of a firm is considered to be a significant factor in a merger and 
acquisition transaction.  Knowledge of corporate behavior and activity tells us that it is 
large firms that are most actively involved in undertaking huge acquisitions.  According 
to resource dependence theorists’, larger firms are more likely to acquire smaller firms.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that large organizations have more resources than 
small organizations to deal with survival threats.  Haunschild (1993) found that large 
firms are more likely than small firms to be buyers13.  Prechel (2000), in his book Big 
Business and the State states that the largest industrial corporations in the United States 
pursued mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s in response to increasingly competitive 
markets (p.236).  Prechel, Boies and Woods (1999) found a positive relationship 
between mergers and acquisitions and corporate form change.  They also found that the 
largest industrial corporations were more likely to change their corporate form.  In 
contrast, the population ecology perspective posits that as organizational size increases, 
inertia also increases (Hannan and Freeman 1984:159)14.  Researchers argue that size of 
                                                        
13
 Managerialists (e.g., Chandler 1962) argue that increased size contributes to change, as growth not 
accompanied by structural change undermines efficiency.   
 
14
 According to Hannan and Freeman (1984), organizations are hard-pressed to adjust their structure as 
they experience relative inertia.  They experience problems in adaption because of internal and external 
factors. Internal factors that cause structural inertia are sunk costs in human and physical capital, internal 
 60 
the firm acts as a barrier to organizational change.  Thus, firm size is included in the 
analysis to control for its effect on change.  
The year of incorporation is included to control for the effects of age.  According 
to population ecology, older organizations are limited in their ability to respond to 
changing environmental demands. Older firms face internal and external barriers to 
adaptation. As older organizations have formalized their internal relationships, 
developed standardized routines and networks of interdependencies with other social 
actors in the environment, and institutionalized their leadership and power distributions, 
reproducibility of structure and inertia increases with age (Hannan and Freeman 
1984:157).  In contrast, some researchers argue that age is not an impediment to change.  
Morris (2000, 2005) found that older banks are more likely to be acquirers in bank 
mergers (p.173).  Prechel et al. (1999), in their examination of corporate form change 
found that the oldest industrial corporations in the United States changed to the 
multilayered subsidiary form (MLSF). 
Intra-industry mergers and acquisitions are included to control for their effect on 
acquisition activity as institutional theory and resource dependency posit different 
motives for growth strategies within an industry.  Institutional theory contends that when 
organizations face uncertainty in the environment, they respond by imitating the 
strategies of other successful organizations.  According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
organizations that are isomorphic with their institutional environment are more likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                   
politics and dependence on the success of previous structures or strategies.  External barriers to change 
include barriers to entry and exit from markets and public legitimation of organizational activity (Hannan 
and Freeman 1984:149).  The theory does not claim that organizations never change; rather they lag 
behind changes in the environment (Hannan and Freeman 1984). 
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receive resources essential to their existence than those that are not. Institutional 
isomorphism conveys legitimacy of the organization to external actors. According to 
resource dependence theory, mergers and acquisitions within an industry, represent 
attempts to either gain control over organizations with which one does business or over 
competitor organizations to increase the firm’s dominance in exchange relationships. 
Resource dependence theorists argue that both symbiotic interdependence and 
competitive uncertainty15 are important in developing predictions about the 
extensiveness of within-industry mergers (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:123).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15
 According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), symbiotic interdependence results when organizations 
exchange resources and competitive interdependence results when organizations are competing for the 
same resource(s).   
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CHAPTER IV 
SAMPLE, OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection 
The top 500 firms in 2005, ranked according to total assets, were used as a 
sample for this study.  These firms are listed on the major stock exchanges in India that 
include the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange1.   
Data on acquisition activity (dependent variable) and data on firm-level 
characteristics (independent variables) for the 14 year period were selected from two 
separate sources (Refer to the section on data sources).  The two databases differed in 
the way they reported the names’ of the companies.  Therefore, I assigned unique ID 
numbers to the companies in each of the data sources’ in order to compare and obtain a 
common list of companies.  For each year, the companies with independent variables 
were ranked according to total assets. The list with the dependent variable was then 
merged with the list of independent variables for each year.  A list-wise deletion of 
cases2 with missing information on the independent variables resulted in a total of 4970 
firm-year observations (Refer to Appendix A for detailed information about the data 
collection process).  
 
                                                        
1
 The Bombay Stock Exchange is the largest and oldest stock exchange in India and has around 5000 
companies listed on it as of November 2002.  There are around 1500 companies listed on the National 
Stock Exchange.   
 
2
 I performed a missing data analysis to check whether the pattern of missing data was systematic or 
random. T-test results showed that some of the missing data were missing completely at random and some 
were not.  
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Operationalization of Variables and Data Sources 
The dependent variable is dichotomous indicating whether or not a firm will 
undertake an acquisition in year t.  It is coded as 1 if the firm makes an acquisition (i.e., 
acquirer) and 0 if the firm does not make an acquisition (i.e., not an acquirer).  Data for 
the dependent variables was obtained from SDC-Mergers and Acquisitions (SDC-
M&A)3 and Thomson One Banker4.   
Several independent variables are included in the analysis to test the hypotheses 
(See Table 4.1 for a list of how I operationalized the concepts from resource dependence 
theory).  The source for most of the financial data is from the Prowess database5.  The 
independent variables are operationalized as follows:  
Debt is a measure of the constraints faced by a firm in investing capital on 
growth strategies and is operationalized as Debt-to-Equity Ratio.  Debt to equity ratio is 
defined as the ratio of total borrowings to net worth. 
Earnings are a measure of the cash flow of a firm and are operationalized in 
terms of return on capital employed.   Return on capital employed is defined as the ratio 
of Profit after taxes (net of non-recurring transactions) to average capital employed.  
Efficiency is a measure of the operating profit margin of a firm.  Operating profit 
                                                        
3
 SDC-Mergers and Acquisitions is transaction based.  It provides a comprehensive coverage of corporate 
transactions that have taken place all over the world.  All corporate transactions involving at least 5 
percent of the ownership of a company where the transaction was valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, 
deals of any value are covered) or where the value of the transaction was undisclosed are included in the 
database. 
 
4
 Thomson One Banker provides access to financial data on public companies, as well as merger and 
acquisition information and market data. 
 
5
 Prowess is a database of large and medium Indian firms. It contains detailed information on over 10,000 
firms. Financial information for each company covers 1500 data items.  This database is a product of the 
Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). 
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margin is operationalized as the profitability margin ratio that is derived by taking into 
account the profits before depreciation, interest and taxes as a percentage of gross sales 
(PBDIT).  According to Prechel and Boies (1998:345), “although organizational 
researchers have not used operating profit margin as a measurement, it is consistent with 
widely held definitions of efficiency, the ratio of cost inputs to outputs produced” 
(Chandler 1962:37; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:11; Williamson 1985:17).   
A subsidiary is a measure of a unit within a firm that controls resources and a 
firm’s dependence on those resources. It is operationalized as a count of number of 
subsidiaries of a firm over the previous two years.  
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Theories, Concepts, and Operationalization 
 
Theory 
 
Concept 
 
Operationalization 
  
Resource Dependence 
  
Capital Constraints 
Debt 
 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio 
 
Resource Dependence 
 
Capital Constraints 
Declining Earnings 
 
 
Return on Capital Employed 
 
 
Resource Dependence 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Capital Constraints 
Inefficiency 
 
Profit before Depreciation, 
Interest and Taxes 
 
 
 
Resource Dependence 
 
Control of Resources  
 
Number of Subsidiaries 
 
 
 
Resource Dependence 
Neo-institutional theory  
 
 
Uncertainty in the Environment 
Imitation 
 
 
Count of Intra-Industry Mergers 
and Acquisitions 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
 
Theory 
 
Concept Operationalization 
 
Resource Dependence 
Organizational Ecology 
 
 
Size 
 
Total Assets 
 
Resource Dependence 
Organizational Ecology 
 
Age Year of Incorporation 
 
 
 
The state-level or political-economic variable is the policy environment.  The 
policy environment represents a period during which an important regulation or an 
amendment to a regulation was passed that affects corporate behavior (Morris 2000).  
The analysis includes three policy environment periods: 1991-1996, 1997-2001 and 
2002-2005. During the first policy environment (i.e., 1991-1996), two important events 
occurred in corporation’s political-legal environment.  The first was the opening up of 
the economy and the second was the amendment of the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act (MRTP) of 1969.  The second policy environment (i.e., 1997-2001) 
witnessed the adoption of the Takeover Code.  During the third policy period (i.e., 2002-
2005) the Competition Act of 2003 replaced the MRTP Act of 1969.   
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Control variables 
The analysis includes the following control variables.  Size of the corporation is 
operationalized in terms of total assets, in thousands of dollars (Morris 2000:46).   Age 
of the corporation is operationalized as original year of incorporation (Prechel and Boies 
1998).  Data for this variable was obtained from Prowess, Mergent Online, SDC-M&A 
and India-Infoline.  In some databases, the year of incorporation reflects the most recent 
incarnation of the company.  In the case of companies that are reorganized, the year of 
incorporation may not reflect the actual age of the company.  It is for this reason that I 
used four databases to check for the initial year of incorporation.  An intra-industry 
merger and acquisition pattern was obtained by counting the number of acquisitions 
completed by firms in a corporation's primary industry over the previous two years.  
Data for this variable was selected from Prowess, SDC-M&A and Thomson One 
Banker.  Acquisition activity varies by industry and ownership. Thus, industry and 
ownership are controlled for in this analysis. The primary industry to which a firm 
belongs includes manufacturing, services, banking and finance6.  Under ownership, the 
categories are Indian, Foreign, Private Indian, Private Foreign, Central Government, 
State Government and Joint sector7.  
 
                                                        
6
 The Prowess database classifies firms into economic activity groups based on their share in various 
products and services as reflected in the total sales of the firm.   
 
7
 The Prowess database organizes firms under an ownership classification system. The system classifies 
firms broadly into government and private firms. Government and private sector firms are further 
classified into groups and sub-groups. A firm is classified into a group that it is most closely associated 
with.  
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Methodology 
 For the analysis of a firm’s decision to undertake an acquisition, I used the 
discrete time event history model (Allison 1984).  Discrete time event history methods 
are useful when the units of time are large i.e., data includes many years and when time-
varying explanatory variables are incorporated into the analysis.  This method has been 
used by previous researchers to study organizational change (Stearns and Allan 1996: 
Theresa Morris 2000, 2004, 2005).   
In the event history model, the dependent variable indicates the odds of event 
occurrence8.  I use the logistic regression function to examine how the odds of event 
occurrence depend on the independent variables and on time. The logit form of the 
model takes the form: 
log [Pit /(1 – Pit )] = α + x (t)ʹ β 
where P refers to the conditional probability that individual i  experiences an event at 
time t, given that the event has not already occurred to that individual, x is a vector of 
the set of the time-varying independent variables, and β is a vector of the unstandardized 
coefficients of the effects of the explanatory variables and α is a constant.  
 Standard survival models assume homogeneity i.e. all individuals are subject to 
the same risk as denoted by the hazard function.  Acquisitions are repeatable events, and 
each acquisition is a decision with a complex strategy behind it.  Since a firm can 
acquire more than once, the event of undertaking an acquisition more than once is 
defined as a repeated event (Allison 1984).  A simple way to deal with repeated events is 
                                                        
8
 Odds indicate a ratio i.e., probability that an event will occur to the probability that an event will not 
occur in year t.  
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to treat the intervals between the events for each case as a separate observation. The 
intervals are then pooled together for all the cases (Allison 1984:51). In this study, the 
intervals are years and the cases are firms.   
In the case of repeated measures on an individual, there might be unobserved factors 
which affect each of the observations recorded for a person.  If the unobserved factors 
are not taken into account, they can lead to bias in the estimated coefficients and their 
standard errors (Teachman n.d.).  Thus, I extend the logit model by including a random 
intercept for each firm to correct for unobserved heterogeneity.  The random intercept 
accounts for variation, both, within and between firms.  
I will use this method to run four models to analyze the impact of the independent 
variables. The first model will include all the years from 1991 to 2005 with dummy 
variables for the policy periods. The remaining three models will be analyses of each 
policy environment period (i.e. 1991-1996; 1997-2001; and 2002-2005).  By performing 
analyses separately for each of the policy environment periods’, one can compare the 
coefficients of the independent variables to see if their explanatory capacity varies across 
the policy periods’.   
Lags are incorporated into the analysis.  I lagged each of the independent variables 
(with the exception of year of incorporation) measuring firm performance on the 
dependent variable. Corporate decisions are generally made with recent data, likely end-
of-the-year data from the previous year (Mason 1997).  Further, mergers and 
acquisitions require regulatory approval.   A lag of one year on the annual data of a firm 
preceding the actual occurrence of the event can sometimes fail to capture the 
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information used by managers to make strategic decisions (Prechel and Boies 1998).  
Given these conditions, a lag of two years seemed appropriate for the study.  For 
example, the likelihood of acquisition in any particular year, say 1992, is based on the 
mean value of the independent variable over the previous two years, i.e. 1991 and 1990.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
The final sample includes 486 individual firms and the longitudinal data set used 
in the final analysis consists of 4970 firm-year observations.  On an average, there were 
10 observations per firm.  Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables.  Table 5.2 reports the correlation between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables.  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Covariate 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Firm’s Acquisition 4970 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Independent Variables 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 4970 -0.06 1.23 -5.30 5.82 
Return on Capital Employed 4970 2.95 0.86 -3.35 5.70 
Profits before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes  4970 2.93 0.81 -2.08 6.90 
Number of Subsidiaries 4970 2.35 3.94 0 34.00 
Control Variables 
Total Assets  4970 5.21 1.48 0.52 11.33 
Year of Incorporation 4970 1964 24 1865 2002 
Intra-Industry Mergers and Acquisitions 4970 89.81 110.35 0 356.00 
Industry Dummy 
Manufacturing 4970 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Banking 4970 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Services 4970 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Finance 4970 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Ownership Dummy 
Central Government  4970 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Foreign 4970 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Indian 4970 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Joint Sector 4970 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Private Indian 4970 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Private Foreign 4970 0.07 0.25 0 1 
State Government 4970 0.01 0.10 0 1 
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Table 5.2 Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables 
   
 Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
1.  Event 1.000        
2.  Debt -0.1004 1.000       
3.  Earnings 0.041 -0.2431 1.000      
4.  Size 0.1073 0.0282 0.0805 1.000     
5.  Profits 0.0421 0.0456 0.3225 0.3407 1.000    
6.  Subsidiaries 0.1912 -0.0946 0.0543 0.1679 0.0376 1.000   
7.  Industry MA 0.1621 -0.1407 -0.1941 0.0373 -0.2485 0.1099 1.000  
8.  Age -0.0274 0.0607 -0.2053 -0.2886 0.0449 -0.0868 0.0197 1.000 
 
Concerning the overall fit of the model, the Wald chi-squared statistics is used to 
test the hypothesis that all of the variables included in the acquisition model (except for 
the intercept) are simultaneously equal to zero. The chi-squared test value of 217.23 with 
significance at the .001 level indicates that we have sufficient information to reject the 
null hypothesis that all of coefficients except the intercept are equal to zero.  In 
conclusion, the result indicates that the full model fits the regression equation 
significantly better than the null model. 
Examination of the random effect parameter in the null model is a precondition 
for the event history logit model with a random intercept.  The likelihood ratio test was 
used to examine the presence of the random effect component in the model.  The .0001 
significance level of the variance component for the random intercept indicates that 
firms differ in terms of their acquisition activity and the use of random-intercept logit 
model is appropriate.  Table 5.3 reports the results of the event history logit model of 
acquisition activity.  
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Table 5.3 Maximum-Likelihood Estimates from the Event History Logit Model of Acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acquisition Activity 
Whole Period 
1991-2005 
Period I 
1991-1996 
Period II 
1997-2001 
Period III 
2002-2005 
 
 
 
 
Covariate Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Intercept 
 
-10.171 
 
(7.085) 
 
-21.894 
 
(26.259) 
 
-19.089* 
 
(11.648) 
 
-1.507 
 
(8.206) 
 
Resource Dependency theory 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio (Debt) -.149** (.063) -.193 (.261) -.247** (.118) -.138* (.079) 
 
Return on Capital Employed 
(Earnings) .229** (.115) .690 (.563) .174 (.204) .271* (.146) 
 
Profits before Depreciation, 
Interest and Taxes 
(Efficiency) .340** (.150) .424 (.514) .910*** (.235) -.004 (.183) 
 
 
Number of Subsidiaries .112*** (.019) .123** 
 
(.053) .111*** (.026) .083*** (.023) 
 
Control Variables 
 
Year of Incorporation (Age) .001 (.004) .006 (.013) .005 (.006) -.002 (.004) 
 
Total Assets (Size) 
          
.225*** (.074) .281 (.248) .298** (.113) .194** (.098) 
 
Intra-Industry Mergers and 
Acquisitions .005*** (.001) .002 (.006) .010*** (.002) .009*** (.002) 
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Table 5.3 Continued 
Whole Period 
1991-2005 
Period I 
1991-1996 
Period II 
1997-2001 
Period III 
2002-2005 
 
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) 
 
Industry Dummy 
 
Manufacture   -.046 (.280) .591 (.921) .064 (.399) -1.354*** (.525) 
 
Banking - .410 (.454) -24.271 (67016.4) -1.937*** (.775) .696 (.588) 
 
Finance - .203 (.529) -22.59 (98679.6) -1.159 (.892) .998 (.636) 
 
Ownership Dummy         
 
Central Government -.536* (.318) -.657 (1.12) -.751 (.539) -.662* (.388) 
 
Foreign .509 (.425) 1.185 (1.087) .688 (.615) .173 (.540) 
 
Joint sector -1.120 (1.125) -23.041 (17394.6) -16.320 (2734.9) -.388 (1.101) 
 
Private Foreign -.006 (.306) .374 (.885) .123 (.470) -.304 (.402) 
 
Private Indian .015 (.338) -22.098 (79021) -.064 (.626) -.096 (.383) 
 
State Government -.740 (1.118) -23.066 (175621.4) .217 (1.211) -16.478 (3714.5) 
 
Policy Period Dummy         
 
Policy Period: 1997-2001                              .853*** (.229) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Policy Period:  2002-2005                 
 
.620** (.306) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
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Note: Services is the reference category for Industry and Indian is the reference category for Ownership.  
Likelihood-ratio test of    25.79 P value <0.0001 
 : Fraction of variance due to the random effect component.   
 
*   = significant at .10 level  
** = significant at .05 level  
*** = significant at .01 level (two-tailed test) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Continued 
Whole Period 
1991-2005 
Period I 
1991-1996 
Period II 
1997-2001 
Period III 
2002-2005 
 
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) 
Random Effects Parameters 
 
      
 
.737 
 
(.105) 
 
1.610 
 
(.401) 
 
.803 
 
(.203) 
 
.518 
 
( .244) 
     
.142 (.035) .441 (.123) .164 (.069) .075 ( .066) 
Model Fit Statistics 
Wald Chi2                   217.23 16.19 103.72 70.63 
Number of Events 4970 1560 1831 1579 
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Discussion of Findings 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, debt has a negative effect on the odds of acquiring in 
the overall time period and all the three policy periods.  The coefficient for debt is 
significant at the .05 level for the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005) and the second policy 
period (i.e., 1997-2001) and it is significant at the .10 level in the third policy period 
(i.e., 2002-2005).  The coefficient is not significant in the first policy period (i.e., 1991-
1996)1.  For every percentage increase in debt to equity ratio, there is on an average a 
1.42 percent ((-.149) * log (1.1) *100) = -1.42)2 decrease in the odds of acquisition 
during the whole period.  In the second and third policy periods, the odds of acquisition 
decrease on an average by 4.11((-.247) * log (1.1)*100) = -4.107) percent and 1.32 ((-
.138) * log (1.1)*100) = -1.315) percent, respectively.  With debt having a negative 
effect on acquisition activity in the second and third policy periods’, it is possible to 
reason that the debt situation of firms was being scrutinized to a great extent in the new 
economic environment.  Prior to the adoption of neo-liberal reforms in 1991, the Indian 
government (i.e., the State) had a policy of bailing out poorly performing companies.  
State-controlled banks and financial institutions that constituted a major source of 
external funding for the activities of firms, always, supported corporate management, 
irrespective of financial position of the firm.  In the second policy period, debt decreased 
the likelihood of acquiring because of a decline in the inability of the State to fund firms.  
Private sector and transnational firms influenced the State to implement new regulations 
                                                        
1
 Data for the first policy environment period (i.e., 1991-1996) had a lot of missing values and it was 
recorded that none of the variables, with the exception of number of subsidiaries, have any significance.   
 
2
 Some of the independent variables like debt to equity ratio (debt), return on capital employed (earnings), 
profit before depreciation, interest and taxes (efficiency) and total assets (size) were log transformed.   
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in the banking and the financial sectors (i.e., Credit Authorization Scheme and Monetary 
Credit Policy Act of 1997).  These regulations required that state-owned banks 
determine the risk levels’ of firms whenever they attempted to borrow large amounts’ of 
capital.   In addition, the Indian government was forced to reduce its ownership stake in 
banks and financial institutions.  In the third policy period, debt decreased the likelihood 
of acquisition with the privatization of banks and financial institutions.  The number of 
foreign banks located in India increased from 148 in 1990 to 259 in 2005. Although 
these private and foreign banks increased the availability of credit, they placed more 
emphasis on the financial discipline of firms.   
These findings support the view that firms with high debt to equity ratios have 
low borrowing capacity.  According to Stearns and Allan (1986:54), financial 
institutions believe that corporations encourage irresponsibility when the debt ratios are 
high and subject them to excessive monitoring.  Debt, also, decreases the discretionary 
power of managers to undertake acquisitions (Davis and Stout 1992: 613).   
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient for earnings is positive in the whole 
period and in the three policy periods.  The coefficient is significant at the .05 and .10 
level in the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005) and the third policy period (i.e., 2002-2005)3, 
respectively.  For every percentage increase in the earnings ratio, there is on an average a 
2.18 ((.229) * log (1.1) *100) = 2.18) percent increase in the odds of acquiring in the 
whole period.  The odds of acquiring increased by 2.58 ((.271) * log (1.1)*100) = 2.58) 
                                                        
3
 According to a study conducted by Business Standard Research Bureau (2006), the corporate earnings of 
Indian firms has increased on an average from 20 percent to 25 percent between 2001 and 2006 because of 
steady economic growth.   
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percent in the third policy period. The finding does not support the hypothesized 
relationship between low earnings and acquisition activity.   With earnings having a 
positive effect on acquisition activity in the third policy period, it is possible to reason 
that with an increase in the deal values’ of merger and acquisition transactions and cross-
border (i.e., transnational) merger and acquisition activity, only those firms with high 
cash flow were able to undertake such transactions.  In addition, the Competition Act of 
2003 defined market dominance in terms of assets of merged entities rather than market 
share of individual firms.  It is plausible to reason that with this redefinition of market 
dominance, big firms with greater market share and more cash flow did not face 
regulatory constraints in undertaking an acquisition.   
The findings’ on earnings is consistent with the conclusion of Morris’s study on 
change in strategy and structure among banks in the United States (2000).  According to 
Morris (2000), “earnings can be perceived as a resource, rather than a constraint, which 
is essential for the survival of a firm”.  While banks and firms in general, have a 
different relationship to cash flow, in order to undertake an acquisition, it is important 
for any organization to have good cash flow.   
          Contrary to Hypothesis 3, the coefficient for efficiency is positive and is 
significant in the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005) and the second policy period (i.e., 1997-
2001) at the .05 and .01 levels’, respectively.  For every one percent increase in 
efficiency, there is on an average a 3.24 ((.340) * log (1.1) *100) = 3.24) percent 
increase in the odds of acquiring in the whole period.  The odds of acquiring increased 
by 8.67 ((.910) * log (1.1) * 100) = 8.67) percent in the second policy period.  The 
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finding does not support the resource dependency argument that inefficient firms are 
more likely to acquire4.   
With efficiency having a strong effect on acquisition activity in the second policy 
period (i.e., 1997-2001), it is possible to reason that firms increased their efficiency by 
divesting their unproductive and non-core businesses in the new policy environment.  
Prior to deregulation, the lack of competition enabled state-owned firms and large 
family-owned businesses to diversify and become huge conglomerates that were 
controlled by inefficient management.  With the adoption of neo-liberal reforms and 
increase in the percentage ownership of domestic companies by transnational 
corporations, it was important for firms to restructure their businesses’ and management 
teams in order to survive.  Although firms were becoming efficient, they were still small 
in scale and market share compared to the transnational corporations and their 
subsidiaries that were establishing their base in India during this period.  It is possible to 
reason that firms that were efficient undertook acquisitions to increase their market share 
and compete with transnational corporations.  Further, with the implementation of the 
Takeover Code in 1994 and a subsequent amendment in 1997, firms were required to 
improve their efficiency in order to avoid being taken over by another firm. In addition, 
the new regulation required firms to pay more attention to shareholder value.   
Regarding the fourth hypothesis, the coefficient for total number of subsidiaries 
of a firm is positive and significant at the .01 level for the whole period (i.e., 1991-
                                                        
4
 Previous literature (Levine and Aaronovitch 1981; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Sorensen 2000; Kumar and 
Rajib 2007) shows that acquiring companies are more profitable than target or non-merging firms.   
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2005), the second (i.e., 1997-2001) and third (i.e., 2002-2005) policy periods.  The 
coefficient is significant at the .05 level for the first policy period (i.e., 1991-1996).  For 
each additional subsidiary in the overall structure of the ultimate parent company, there 
is on an average an 11.85 percent ((exp. (.112)-1)*100 = 11.85) increase in the odds of 
acquiring in the whole period.  In the three policy periods, the odds of acquiring increase 
by 13.08 percent ((exp. (.123)-1) * 100 = 13.08), 11.74 percent ((exp. (.111)-1) * 100 = 
11.74) and 8.65 percent ((exp. (.083)-1) * 100 = 8.65), respectively.  These findings (i.e., 
in terms of statistical significance and large magnitude effect) provide strong support for 
the hypothesized relationship between number of subsidiaries of a firm and acquisition 
activity.   
  
Control Variables: Findings 
The effect of control variables on acquisition activity is summarized in the 
following section.  The coefficient for age was in the expected direction but not 
significant during the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005) and the first (i.e., 1991-1996) and 
second (i.e., 1997-2001) policy periods.  The coefficient was negative but not significant 
in the third policy period (i.e., 2002-2005).    
The effect of size was positive and highly significant at the .01 and .05 levels’ in 
the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005) and in the second (i.e., 1997-2001) and third (i.e., 
2002-2005) policy periods.  The hypothesis derived from resource dependence theory is 
supported.  According to resource dependency theory, size is an indication of the power 
of the company to undertake organizational change.  For every percentage increase in 
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total assets, the odds of acquiring increased by 2.14 percent ((.225) * log (1.1) *100 = 
2.14) in the whole period.  In the second and third policy periods, for each percentage 
increase in assets, there is on an average a 2.84 ((.298) * log (1.1) * 100 = 2.84) percent, 
and 1.84 ((.194) * log (1.1) * 100 = 1.84) percent increase in the log odds of acquiring, 
respectively.  These results (i.e., in terms of statistical significance and large magnitude) 
are consistent with the findings of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Palmer et al. (1995), 
Prechel et al. (1999), and Morris (2000).  However, this finding is contrary to the 
proposition of organizational ecology theory, which suggests that size is negatively 
related to organizational change due to inertia.  With size having a positive effect on 
acquisition activity, it is possible to reason that larger firms engaged in acquisitions as a 
result of changes in regulations governing mergers and acquisitions.  The Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 (amended) and the Competition Act of 2003 
eliminated size as a criterion to determine dominance in an economic sector.  Some of 
the largest companies in India (e.g., Hindalco, Aditya Birla Group, Tata Steel, Reliance 
Industries, Tata Motors, etc) are still very active in undertaking acquisitions.  Examples 
include the acquisition of Corus (Europe’s second largest steel producer) by Tata Steel in 
2007, Hindalco’s acquisition of Novelis (US based aluminum firm) in 2007, acquisition 
of Daewoo’s truck manufacturing unit (South Korea), British Jaguar Land Rover and 
Trilix (Italy) by Tata Motors in 2004, 2008 and 2010, respectively.   
The coefficient for intra-industry mergers and acquisitions is positive and 
significant at the .01 level in the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005) and the second (i.e., 
1996-2001) and third (i.e., 2002-2005) policy periods.  For each previous merger and 
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acquisition in a firm’s primary industry, the odds of acquiring increased by 0.5 ((exp. 
(.005)-1)*100) = 0.5) percent in the whole period.  In the second and third policy 
periods, the odds of acquiring increased by one ((exp. (.010)-1*100) =1) percent, and 0.9 
((exp. (.009)-1)*100) = 0.9) percent, respectively.   
A glance at individual industry and ownership categories, reveals that among 
industries, the odds of acquisition in the manufacturing sector compared to the services 
sector decreased by 74 percent ((exp. (-1.354)-1) * 100= -74) in the third policy period.  
In the banking sector with reference to the services sector, the odds of acquisition 
decreased by 86 percent ((exp. (-1.973) -1) * 100= -86) in the second policy period.  The 
coefficients for the manufacturing and banking sector variables are highly significant at 
the .01 levels’.  The effect of central government ownership was positive and significant 
at the .10 level for the whole period (i.e., 1991-2005).  The coefficient was negative and 
significant at the .10 level in the third policy period (i.e., 2002-2005).  The odds of 
acquisition decreased by 41.4 percent ((exp. (-.536) -1) * 100) = 5.5) in the whole 
period.  The odds of acquisition decreased by 48 percent ((exp. (-.662)-1) *100= -48) in 
the third policy period.  The decrease in acquisition activity among firms owned by the 
central government is consistent with the decrease in the dominance of this sector in 
India’s economy.  With the removal of entry barriers in several economic sectors 
following the liberalization of the economy, there has been a transition in the ownership 
of firms from being state-controlled to that of private and transnational control.    
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Summary of Findings 
 
The quantitative analysis shows that the odds of acquisition increased in the 
second (i.e., 1997-2001) (β = .853) and third (i.e., 2002-2005) (β = .620) policy periods’ 
as compared to the first policy period (i.e., 1991-1996).  The effects of the independent 
variables were consistent across the policy periods, with the exception of earnings and 
profits before depreciation, interest and taxes. The coefficients for the independent 
variables in the first policy period (i.e., 1991-1996), with the exception of number of 
subsidiaries (β = .123), were not significantly different from zero.  The statistically 
significant effect of the independent variables in the second policy period (i.e., 1997-
2001) shows that profits before depreciation, interest and taxes had the largest impact on 
acquisition activity (β = .910) followed by debt (β = -.247) and number of subsidiaries (β 
= .111).  The statistically significant impact of the explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable in the third policy period (i.e., 2002-2005) does not follow the same 
trend as second policy period.  In the third policy period, earnings had the strongest 
impact on acquisition activity (β = .271), followed by debt (β = -.138) and number of 
subsidiaries (β = .083).  On a comparative note, the effects of the independent variables 
in the second policy period were stronger than that of the effects in the third policy 
period.  Among the control variables, age, size and intra-industry mergers and 
acquisitions had consistent effects across the policy periods. Size and intra-industry 
mergers and acquisitions had a statistically significant effect on acquisition activity.  
Size had the strongest effect on acquisition activity during the whole period (β = .225) 
and in the second (β = .298) and third (β = .194) policy periods, as compared to intra-
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industry mergers and acquisitions.   
Resource dependence theory received some support, although the strength of the 
support varied with the policy period.  Debt was statistically significant in the second 
(i.e., 1997-2001) and third (i.e., 2002-2005) policy periods but not in the predicted 
direction. The effect of earnings was not in the expected direction. However, earnings 
had a statistically significant impact on acquisition activity in the third policy period 
(i.e., 2002-2005). The number of subsidiaries of a firm was the only variable to have a 
statistically significant effect on acquisition activity in all the policy periods.   The effect 
of efficiency was not in the predicted direction.  However, in the second policy period 
(i.e., 1997-2001), efficiency (i.e., high operating profit margin) had a statistically 
significant effect on acquisition activity.  Total assets had a statistically significant 
impact on acquisition activity in the second (i.e., 1997-2001) and third (i.e., 2002-2005) 
policy periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this research study was to understand mergers and acquisitions 
among Indian firms from 1991 to 2005.  In order to do so, I undertook a qualitative and 
quantitative examination of the factors that guide mergers and acquisitions in three 
policy periods (i.e., 1991-1996, 1997-2001 and 2002-2005)1.   
 
Qualitative Analysis: Summary and Theoretical Implications 
For the qualitative analysis, I analyzed how historical changes in a corporation’s 
political-legal environment affected merger and acquisition activity.  The qualitative 
analysis begins with the supposition that organizational change is historically contingent.   
Historical contingency theory draws from capital dependency theory, which is a 
variation on resource dependence theory and suggests that periodic constraints to capital 
accumulation compel action (Prechel 1990:665).  Capital dependency theory focuses on 
historical transitions that cause social change (Prechel 2000).  Thus, I examined decay-
exploration transitions in the social structure of accumulation to observe (1) the shift in 
the dominant economic sector and the internal composition of the dominant power bloc, 
and (2) how corporate property rights were redefined politically as a response to 
domestic economic conditions and globalization in each policy period (i.e., 1991-1996, 
                                                        
1According to Hoskisson, et al. (2000), the use of quantitative and qualitative data to examine firm 
dynamics in emerging economies is helpful in yielding new, relevant and reliable findings (p.257).   
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1997-2001 and 2002-2005) (see Table 2.1).  The analysis showed that big business 
mobilized politically to change the political-legal arrangements in which corporations 
are embedded in order to advance their capital accumulation agendas.  Some of the 
major changes that were brought about in India’s political-legal environment had inter-
related consequences in terms of their influence in attempting to resolve the economic 
crisis and policies regarding mergers and acquisitions: First, the introduction of neo-
liberal reforms reduced the role of the state in industrial production, encouraged private 
enterprise and set the stage for multinational corporations to establish their base in India.  
Second, the adoption of the multilayer subsidiary form facilitated access to internal 
capital and foreign investment.  Third, the deregulation of financial and equity markets 
increased the availability and decreased the cost of external capital.     
The qualitative analysis helps to address a question that often arises in historical 
sociology: under what conditions do social actors act or not act based on an interest that 
they share (Tilly 1981).  The analysis shows that decline in the rates of capital 
accumulation was the common concern that brought together different class fractions, 
like domestic and global business interests and transnational financial organizations in 
India.  The different class fractions, then, attempted to resolve their economic concerns 
at the political level by influencing the state to adopt policies that will facilitate the 
process of capital accumulation. By acknowledging the relationship between the state 
and capitalist class fractions and by offering a theoretically firm conception of the 
relationship, historical contingency theory guides our understanding of the way historical 
conditions shape and transform business policies and subsequently, corporate change 
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(Prechel 1990, 2000).   
 
Quantitative Analysis: Summary and Theoretical Implications 
For the quantitative analysis, I derived hypotheses from resource dependence 
theory to examine factors that cause one firm to acquire another firm using meso level 
(i.e., characteristics of the corporation) variables.   
Examining the central tenets of resource dependence theory in the quantitative 
analysis and a variation thereof (i.e., capital dependence theory) in the qualitative part, 
provides support for the argument that firms did not merely react to the conditions (i.e., 
constraints on capital) in their environment but attempted to alter them.  Firms modified 
institutional arrangements that were unfavorable to the accumulation of capital by 
pressurizing state managers to implement policy that was favorable to merge and 
acquire. In addition, the findings provide support for the argument that firms attempted 
to alter their resource dependence by modifying their internal organizational structure.  
With the adoption of the multilayer subsidiary form by firms in India and with 
subsidiaries having a highly significant and positive effect on acquisition activity, the 
findings reflect that subsidiaries can be conceptualized as resources that are essential to 
the survival of the organization.  Subsidiaries can be conceptualized as a resource 
because of their financial and organizational characteristics. From a financial 
perspective, it increases the capacity of management to raise capital without taking on 
additional debt, thereby reducing the dependence that one organization has on another.  
From an organizational perspective, it allows managements to increase their control over 
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corporate entities (Prechel et al. 2008).   
Overall, the resource dependence model predicts merger and acquisition activity 
in the different policy periods; all four independent variables in the model covering the 
entire period (1991-2005) are statistically significant.  The entire period from 1991 to 
2005 can be viewed as a period of intense deregulation because of the adoption of neo-
liberal reforms, changes in regulations governing mergers and acquisitions, regulatory 
changes in the banking, financial and foreign direct investment sectors’ and the 
privatization of several industrial sectors.  A period of deregulation is a period of 
uncertainty for firms.  During this period of uncertainty, firms controlling more 
resources (i.e., in terms of total assets2 and number of subsidiaries) were more likely to 
undertake acquisition activity as they have leverage in organization-environment 
relationships.  Firms are able to reduce their dependence on other organizations in the 
environment and increase the dependence of other organizations on them.  On a similar 
note, the positive effect of earnings and efficiency on acquisition activity in different 
policy periods indicates that during periods’ of uncertainty, an organization utilizes its 
internal resources before seeking external sources in order to undertake proactive change 
(Prechel 1998, 2000; Keister 2004).  Thus, size of the firm, number of subsidiaries 
earnings and efficiency may be conceptualized as resources which confer power on the 
organization to undertake proactive change (Morris 2007). 
The contrary relationship of the resource dependent variable (i.e., debt) to 
acquisition activity in the policy periods’ indicate that during a period of uncertainty, 
                                                        
2
 The changes in the asset limit requirement as adopted by the amended Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP) in 1991 and the Competition Act in 2003 reduced the amount of oversight that 
firms would be subjected to before undertaking a merger and acquisition transaction. 
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firms are less likely to undertake capital intensive strategies.  However, previous 
literature does show that in turbulent environments’, firms are more likely to undertake a 
merger and/or acquisition transaction than set up a new manufacturing facility.   It is 
possible to reason that during periods’ of uncertainty, firms which are capital dependent 
did merge with/or acquire smaller firms where the deal value of the transaction was not 
very high.  If one were to incorporate deals values’ as a variable in the analysis, it might 
be interesting to see whether companies that were capital dependent merged with/or 
acquired other companies that were being sold cheaply.  This is something that will have 
to be explored in future research.   
The positive effect of previous intra-industry M&As on acquisition activity in the 
different policy periods can also be explained from the resource dependence perspective.  
In transition economies, firms, initially, are more likely to imitate the strategies of other 
successful firms in the environment.  However, adaption to new conditions requires a 
complete understanding of how other firms in the environment operate or how new 
regulations will impact their choice of strategy.  Thus, firms are more likely to invest in 
training, research and learning in order to undertake merger and acquisition strategies.  It 
is possible to reason that those industries that have a high percentage of acquisitions 
most likely have laws that support the activity and environments conducive to the spread 
of a particular growth strategy.  Thus, a firm is likely to acquire another firm not simply 
to mimic other firms but because this strategy is likely to be successful in dealing with 
the environment of the particular industry (Morris 2007).  The deregulation of certain 
industries like cement and telecommunications in India led to a wave of mergers and 
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acquisitions in these sectors.   
However, the examination of each specific policy period within this era of 
deregulation, which was conducted because the dummy variables for the policy periods 
is statistically significant3, suggest that some variables in the model have more 
explanatory power in some policy periods than others.   
Debt had a negative effect on the odds of acquiring in the second (i.e., 1997-
2001) and third (i.e., 2002-2005) policy period.  The coefficient for debt is negative but 
not statistically significant in the first policy period (i.e., 1991-1996).  These findings 
suggest that debt did not financially constrain firms in the first policy period because the 
State had a policy of bailing out poorly performing firms.  However, in the second policy 
period, debt became a financial constraint and decreased the likelihood of acquiring as 
there was a decline in the ability of the State to help firms.  State-owned banks and 
financial institutions were criticized by capitalist class fractions for lending money to 
firms without assessing their risk levels’. These banks and financial institutions were a 
major source of external funding for firms and they always supported management, 
irrespective of the financial position of the firm.  The Credit Authorization scheme and 
Monetary Credit Policy Act of 1997 required that state-owned banks determine the risk 
levels’ of firms whenever they attempted to borrow large amounts of capital.  Further, 
pressure from business associations like the Confederation of Indian Industry forced the 
State to reduce their ownership stake in banks and financial institutions and encourage 
                                                        
3
 The policy dummy for the periods 1997-2001 and 2002-2005 indicate that the odds of acquisition was 
significantly larger than the odds of acquisition in the period 1991-1996.  The odds of acquisition in the 
second policy period (i.e., 1997-2001) and the third policy period (i.e., 2002-2005) increased by 135 
percent and 86 percent, respectively.   
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privatization of these sectors.  The argument was that state-controlled banks and 
financial institutions could not properly monitor firms because they had a conflict of 
interest as both creditors and shareholders.  In the third policy period, debt decreased the 
likelihood of acquisition with the privatization of banks and financial institutions.  The 
number of foreign banks located in India increased from 148 in 1990 to 259 in 2005.  
Although these private and foreign banks increased the availability of credit, they placed 
emphasis on the financial discipline of firms.  Thus, firms with high debt were less likely 
to receive loans in order to pursue merger and acquisition strategies.   
Return on capital employed (i.e., earnings) had a positive effect on acquisition 
activity in the third policy period (i.e., 2002-2005). The coefficient for earnings is 
positive but not statistically significant in the first (i.e., 1991-1996) and second (i.e., 
1997-2001) policy periods’.  It is not clear as to why earnings did not have an effect on 
acquisition activity in the earlier periods.  A possible explanation could be that in the 
initial periods, those firms with more earnings were acquired by other firms, given the 
uncertainty in the environment.  The findings for the third policy period suggest that 
within this stage, which witnessed a wave of high deal value and cross-border (i.e., 
transnational) merger and acquisition transactions, only those firms with high earnings 
are capable of undertaking such deals.  In addition, the Competition Act of 2003 defined 
market dominance in terms of assets of merged entities rather than market share of 
individual firms.  It is plausible to reason that with this redefinition of market 
dominance, firms with greater market share and more earnings did not face regulatory 
constraints in undertaking an acquisition.   
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Efficiency had a positive effect on acquisition activity in the second policy 
period (i.e., 1997-2001).  The coefficient for efficiency was positive but not statistically 
significant in the first policy period (i.e., 1991-1996).  In the third policy period (i.e., 
2002-2005), the coefficient for efficiency was negative but not statistically significant.  
These findings suggest that prior to deregulation, the lack of competition enabled state-
owned firms and large family-owned businesses to diversify and become huge 
conglomerates that were controlled by inefficient management.  With the adoption of 
neo-liberal reforms in 1991 and increase in the percentage ownership of domestic 
companies by transnational corporations, firms were forced to restructure their 
businesses’ and management teams in order to increase their profits.  It is possible to 
reason that in the first policy period, firms were attempting to, first, improve their 
efficiency by divesting their unproductive and non-core businesses before undertaking 
mergers and acquisitions.  In the second policy period, although firms were becoming 
efficient, they were still small in scale and market share compared to the transnational 
corporations and their subsidiaries that were establishing their base in India during this 
period.  It is possible to reason that firms that were efficient undertook acquisitions to 
increase their market share and compete with transnational corporations during this 
period.  Further, the adoption of the Takeover Code in 1994 and a subsequent 
amendment in 1997 had the effect of disciplining firms to use profits to increase 
shareholder value.  It is surprising that efficiency did not have a positive effect on 
acquisition activity in the third policy period, taking in to account the competition from 
transnational corporations and the purpose of the Takeover code.  It is possible to reason 
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that efficient firms became targets of cross-border acquisitions that were on the increase 
in this policy period.   
The total number of subsidiaries had a positive effect on acquisition activity and 
is the most consistent variable in the analysis; it is statistically significant in all three 
policy periods.  
The competing theories of corporate change included in this analysis have a 
weak conception of social action and propose different mechanisms by which 
organizations act and change. The findings about age and size do not add to our 
understanding of the constraints that inertia has on organizational change.  This stems 
from one of the weaknesses of population ecology in that it undermines the power that 
larger and older organizations possess.   
 
Implications of the Study 
 This study has important implications for theories that attempt to explain mergers 
and acquisitions from a sociological perspective.  First, it is important to understand the 
influence of context on firm behavior.  Firms have the same motives but different means 
of achieving their goals in different contexts.  This study reveals that while the behavior 
of firms in India has been unique on some dimensions, many firm motivations are 
universal.  While capital constraints had a consistent and positive effect on change and 
strategy among banks in the United States, it did not do so in the Indian situation.  Firms, 
both in the West and emerging economies, appear to be motivated by their desire to 
survive and reduce their dependence on external entities. This leads us to the second 
 93 
implication of this study and that is to assess the combined impact of external and 
internal constraints on accumulation of capital on acquisition activity.  The assumption is 
that constraints that exist in the environment may undermine the ability of firms facing 
internal constraints to undertake change.  For example, state-controlled financial 
institutions that charge high interest on loans may deter the motivations of a firm facing 
debt problems to undertake change.  Finally, there is a need to review the motives that 
drive mergers and acquisitions with the increasing globalization of markets. The 
emergence of global markets has reduced the general level of dependency that any one 
firm has on others both at the levels’ of economy and industry.  The assumption is that 
firms seem to be motivated more by a desire to compete on the global level before 
achieving stability in their local economies’.   
 
Limitations and Scope of the Study 
This study has certain limitations. The data collection was conducted 
systematically and included a representative sample of firms.  However, the data was 
limited because of the following reasons. First, during the initial phases of transition in 
the economy and subsequently, it is possible that firms in India did not report their 
company information.  This affected the quality of the data used in the analysis.  There 
were missing data problems which reduced the number of firm-year observations.  
Second, the limited availability of financial data limited my options with respect to the 
variables that I would have liked to use in the study.  Although the results provide 
 94 
support for some of the ideas presented in the study, the findings should be interpreted in 
light of the limitations.   
The study of mergers and acquisitions among firms in India offers important 
advantages for examining firm behavior in emerging markets.  This sociological study 
contributes to a small but expanding literature on M&As in India.  However, it is not a 
representative context.  Firms in emerging markets have different corporate property 
rights, have different relationships with state agencies and face different capital 
constraints (Zhou, Li, Zhao and Cai 2003).  These institutional arrangements can have 
different effects on a firm pursuing a particular growth strategy.  With India, China, 
Brazil and Russia (i.e., BRIC nations) emerging as the world’s greatest economies, it 
would be interesting to compare and contrast factors that affect strategies for growth in 
these countries from a sociological perspective.   
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APPENDIX A 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
The data for the study was collected from the following sources: Prowess, SDC-
Mergers and Acquisitions, Thomson One Banker, Mergent Online and India-Infoline.  
The first step in the data collection process was to obtain a list of publicly listed 
Indian firms.  I selected the Prowess database which is a product of the Center for 
Monitoring the Indian economy (CMIE).  This database has been used by previous 
researchers in their studies of Indian firms.   The database contains detailed financial 
information on Indian firms that are both listed and unlisted.  The public firms are listed 
on the major stock exchanges in India that include the Bombay Stock Exchange and the 
National Stock Exchange.  Financial information for each firm covers 1500 data items.   
With the help of the Prowess database, I was able to obtain a list of 5930 listed 
Indian companies.  These companies belonged to four different industrial sectors i.e., 
Manufacturing, Services, Banking and Finance.  Their ownership categories also varied 
based on who held majority stock in them i.e., Indian, Foreign, State and Central 
Government and Joint sectors.  The majority of the companies (i.e., almost 95%) in the 
Prowess database are Indian companies and the remaining (i.e., 5%) are foreign firms.  
The data for the independent variables was selected from the Prowess database.  The 
Prowess database did not have merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction information, 
going as far back as 1991. It did have some recent information on M&A transactions.   
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In order to collect information on the dependent variable (i.e., Mergers and 
Acquisitions), I used two databases i.e., SDC-Mergers and Acquisitions and Thomson 
One Banker.  SDC-Mergers and Acquisitions is transaction based. It provides a 
comprehensive coverage of corporate transactions that have taken place all over the 
world.  Thomson One Banker contains financial data on public companies, merger and 
acquisition information and market data.  I selected merger and acquisition transaction 
information on publicly listed Indian firms in these two databases based on certain 
criteria i.e., name of acquiring firm and target firm, deal value of the transaction, date of 
the transaction, industrial classification of the target and acquiring firm, country to 
which the target and acquiring firm belong and the status of the transaction (i.e., 
completed, pending, withdrawn, rumor).  Since the data was transaction-based, I had to 
create a list of Indian target and acquirer firms.  
The Prowess database and the SDC-Mergers and Acquisitions and Thomson One 
Banker databases’ differed in the way they reported the names of the publicly listed 
Indian firms.  Therefore, I created and assigned unique ID numbers to the list of firms 
obtained from the different databases. A manual comparison of the names of the 
companies in the two lists was performed and a common list of 1436 companies was 
obtained.  Since many of these companies did not have complete financial information 
from 1991 to 2005, I decided to use the top 500 companies (i.e., ranked according to 
total assets) in 2005 as a sample for the study.   
Once I had selected the sample, I had to create a list of firms with the 
independent and dependent variable for each year (i.e., from 1991 to 2005).  The lists of 
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firms for each year were sorted according to total assets.  Data for the other independent 
variables (i.e., debt, earnings, subsidiaries and efficiency) was collected.  I lagged each 
independent variable by two years since it takes time for firms to set up a merger and 
acquisition strategy.  For example, for company A in the year 1991, the mean of total 
assets for the previous two years i.e., 1989 and 1990 was calculated and used in the 
analysis.  Thus, I had created a separate list of companies with the independent variables 
for each year from 1991 to 2005.  With the help of the lists for each year, I manually 
went through the merger and acquisition transaction information and coded whether the 
firms were acquirers, targets or did not experience the event in each year.  Acquirers 
were coded as 1 and targets as 2.  Those firms that did not experience any event were 
coded as 0.   As I manually went through the dataset, I was able to see that many of the 
firms were not targets in several of the years.  Thus, I decided to study only the acquiring 
firms.  I selected mergers and acquisitions with the highest deal value in each year in 
order to code the data for the dependent variable.  If the deal value information was not 
available, I selected the first “completed” transaction for that year.  The 15 lists of 
companies (identified by their ID numbers) for each year with the independent and 
dependent variables’ were merged together using STATA software.  Thus, a company 
could have a minimum of one observation to a maximum of 15 observations in the panel 
dataset.   
The data for the independent variable “year of incorporation” had to be verified 
in 4 different databases. The reason for doing so is because some firms that have already 
merged with/or acquired another firm in a particular year will have that year listed as 
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their year of incorporation i.e., the year of incorporation reflects the most recent 
incarnation of the company.  Data for the independent variable “previous mergers and 
acquisitions” in a firm’s primary industry was also manually coded.  This data was 
collected from the merger and acquisition transaction information.  For example, if 
Company A belongs to the manufacturing sector, then for the year 1991, I counted the 
number of previous mergers and acquisitions in the manufacturing sector for the years’ 
1989 and 1990.  
Some of the firms in the dataset had missing values on their independent 
variables. Therefore, for each independent variable in the dataset, I created a “missing 
value” variable.  The “missing value” variable consisted of cases that had missing values 
on a particular variable versus those cases that were not missing a value on that variable.  
The “missing value” variable for each of the independent variables’ was combined to 
form another variable called “Miss”.  I used t-tests in order to understand whether the 
pattern of missing values was random or systematic.  The pattern was random for most 
of the independent variables but for total assets. This was observed in a manual 
examination of the dataset where it was found that firms with smaller asset size had 
more missing values.  I deleted the missing values list-wise and the final dataset had 
4970 firm-year observations.   
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APPENDIX B 
 
Frequency table showing number of Acquisitions by Indian firms in each year 
 
Year 
 
Number of Acquisitions 
 
1991-1992 
 
 
0 
1992-1993 
 
2 
1993-1994 
 
3 
1994-1995 
 
5 
1995-1996 
 
17 
1996-1997 
 
3 
1997-1998 
 
10 
1998-1999 
 
16 
1999-2000 
 
18 
2000-2001 
 
42 
2001-2002 
 
33 
2002-2003 
 
31 
2003-2004 
 
36 
2004-2005 
 
39 
2005-2006 
 
44 
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